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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
MODELING SECURITY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR MOBILE
MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS USING GAME THEORY
by
Laurent Lavoisier Yamen Njilla
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor Niki Pissinou, Major Professor
This dissertation presents novel approaches to modeling and analyzing security and
resource allocation in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). The research involves the
design, implementation and simulation of different models resulting in resource sharing
and security’s strengthening of the network among mobile devices. Because of the
mobility, the network topology may change quickly and unpredictably over time.
Moreover, data-information sent from a source to a designated destination node, which
is not nearby, has to route its information with the need of intermediary mobile nodes.
However, not all intermediary nodes in the network are willing to participate in datapacket transfer of other nodes. The unwillingness to participate in data forwarding is
because a node is built on limited resources such as energy-power and data. Due to
their limited resource, nodes may not want to participate in the overall network
objectives by forwarding data-packets of others in fear of depleting their energy power.
To enforce cooperation among autonomous nodes, we design, implement and simulate
new incentive mechanisms that used game theoretic concepts to analyze and model the
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strategic interactions among rationale nodes with conflicting interests. Since there is no
central authority and the network is decentralized, to address the concerns of mobility
of selfish nodes in MANETs, a model of security and trust relationship was designed
and implemented to improve the impact of investment into trust mechanisms. A series
of simulations was carried out that showed the strengthening of security in a network
with selfish and malicious nodes. Our research involves bargaining for resources in a
highly dynamic ad-hoc network. The design of a new arbitration mechanism for
MANETs utilizes the Dirichlet distribution for fairness in allocating resources. Then,
we investigated the problem of collusion nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks with an
arbitrator. We model the collusion by having a group of nodes disrupting the bargaining
process by not cooperating with the arbitrator. Finally, we investigated the resource
allocation for a system between agility and recovery using the concept of Markov
decision process. Simulation results showed that the proposed solutions may be helpful
to decision-makers when allocating resources between separated teams.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The continuing advances in wireless communications and hardware design technology
have led to the manufacturing of low-cost, low-maintenance and easy to deploy devices
in order to create an ad-hoc network without relying on pre-existing infrastructure. The
nurturing dream of building a pervasive and ubiquitous network is becoming highly
plausible. A pervasive network by definition has the ability to offer spontaneous services
created on-the-fly by autonomous mobile devices that interact with ad-hoc connections.
Moreover, the ubiquitous network is the concept that provides available services in a
network by giving users the ability to access services anytime and irrespective of their
location. [1] [2].
To fulfill this vision of a network, it requires the participation of several devices or nodes,
from multiple network domains with completely diverse objectives and preferences. With
the rapid advances in computer and wireless communications, devices and all associated
techniques and concepts, mobile sensor networks are becoming practical and attracting
more research attention in recent years. The decentralized nature, minimal configuration
and quick and easy deployment of wireless ad hoc networks make them suitable for
emergency situations, such as natural disasters or military conflicts where there is no
infrastructure or central nodes to depend on. Wireless ad hoc networks have emerged as
an important information transmission paradigm in both military and commercial
applications such as intrusion detection, battlefield surveillance, disaster rescue missions,

1

hostile environment monitoring and target tracking. Flexibility, on the other hand, brings
in many research challenges.
The mobility of the device is also a challenge due to the ubiquity of the network. By
nature, wireless ad-hoc network is a highly dynamic self-organizing network with limited
channels. Servicing mobile users brought a new prospective to an already dynamic
network, the mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). A MANET is a self-organizing, selfconfiguring network of mobile hosts wirelessly interconnected. The mobile hosts or
mobile nodes (MNs) are free to move randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily.
Therefore, the network connectivity and topology could be dynamically changed rapidly
and unpredictably [3]. A MANET can be operated in a stand alone, or connected to other
networks. Moreover, a MANET can be quickly deployed in any area. Without the support
of any fixed infrastructure, mobile nodes need to cooperate with each other to maintain
the link and routing information. Each MN acts not only as a host, but also as a router for
data forwarding between other MNs.
Network security and device autonomy, for example, are major issues in order to achieve
robust and reliable communication in wireless ad hoc networks. The wireless
communication between typically autonomous devices, where each device makes a
decision whether and to what extent it wishes to be part of the network's main purpose,
can become a challenge. In the pursuit of their own objectives, the participating devices
in the network could therefore exhibit some misbehavior patterns – either by being selfish
or by being malicious [4]. Because of their limited resources like battery power, low
radio transmission range, memory spaces and computational power, a selfish node
attempts to save its resources by not participating in any network task. As a consequence,
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each node will strive to save its limited supply while competing against needy nodes with
a depleted supply to gain access to others’ resources with the goal of maximizing their
own capacity. A malicious node’s main objective is to cause damage to the network.
They use their available resources to launch various attacks, for example, Denial of
service (DoS), selective forwarding, Sybil attack and sinkhole attack. The faulty node
misbehaves in the network because of the default in its circuitry which may be due to a
physical damage. The internal damage causes the node not to follow the protocol
recommendations.
The security is the primary concern of an ad-hoc network deployed infrastructure-less.
The network needs to guarantee a secure data transmission between different nodes and
also, the confidentiality, the integrity and the availability of the data should be
guaranteed. Henceforth, the primary issue that would arise with autonomous nodes in an
ad hoc network would be packet forwarding. Moreover, here is a scenario, nodes are
selfish and there is neither infrastructure nor a central authority. When the sender and the
destination are not in transmission range, packets are sent through a multi-hop
communication. Intermediary nodes are needed to facilitate packet forwarding. But, there
is a transmission cost in battery power usage and bandwidth associated with forwarding
packets and therefore, it is not in the best interest of an intermediate node to deplete its
own resources to forward others’s packets. Meanwhile, if all nodes behave the same way
by refusing to forward packets for others, the network will collapse. However, no node is
interested in a collapsed network as the outcome.
The network performance degradation can be attributed to node misbehavior. Therefore,
proficient mechanisms need to be implemented to enforce node cooperation and
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strengthen network security at all layer levels. In fact, selfish behavior is a thorn in the
side of networks without central authority. Selfishness and overall network objectives
may be the cause of misbehaviors in other layers of the network with autonomous nodes.
For instance, by looking at the different layers of the network, there is a tremendous
impact that selfish nodes can cause. For example, at the physical layer, a node can
selfishly decide to ignore the network protocol by increasing its power to transmit its
packets at a successful rate after detecting failure. The general response of other selfish
nodes in the vicinity would be to follow the actions generating the successful
transmission rate. As for the result, the overall network performance will decrease and
deteriorate tremendously which will cause the collapse of the network. At the link/MAC
layer, some nodes may attempt to send more packets by ignoring the backoff period.
While the backoff period occurs for other nodes to use the medium for transmission, so
instead of waiting for other nodes to finish sending their packets, a selfish node may
attempt to quickly send its own packets. As a consequence, an increase in packet collision
would drastically affect the network performance because of selfish nodes. On the
transport layer, the most widely used protocol in this layer is the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [5] [6]. The main reasons for TCP
performance degradation in MANETs are contention between sharing terminals, hidden
terminal problems, and packet losses in the MAC layer. Furthermore, path disconnections
arising from mobility and exponential retransmission backoff in the TCP layer also
exacerbate performance. A selfish node may be unwilling to decrease its window size
during congestion to take full advantage of its own flow. Therefore, in the case that all
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nodes follow the same behavior, congestion and contention in the network will be
worsened.
Security mechanisms in traditional wired networks rely on trusted systems like certificate
authority (CA) to manage security operations. In the absence of such authority, nodes are
required to integrate tools to auto-secure themselves and to rely (trust) on each other to
secure the network and protect their privacy. Trust, in this circumstance, can be defined
as the confidence a node in the network has about the appropriate participation of others
in the security mechanism. Without trust, no rational node will participate in any security
mechanism that involves the cooperation of numerous nodes to be successful. Therefore,
several security mechanisms require some level of trust in their design and
implementation [7]. Let us consider a provider with users to provide network services.
Securing the network service in order to protect the users’ privacy and personal
information against cyberattacks or hackers is costly for the service providers. A provider
would prefer to minimize its investment in upgrading the network infrastructure while
financially increasing its bottom line with customers using the service or product. On the
other hand, without regular upgrades to the network infrastructures from the provider,
there are vulnerabilities generated from the software used or developed by programmers
and components installed in the network; the upgrade of a vulnerability may open the
system to other vulnerabilities. With the attackers always launching attacks, it is just a
matter of time to breach the system due to an undetected or un-patched vulnerability. A
breached system would have private information and privacy of the users compromised.
One option available to unsatisfied users is to quit their service provider. Without any
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doubt, we are faced with a conflict of interest between a service provider and its users.
The optimum behavior of the provider will be linked to the users’ strategies.
Game theory is the unifying mathematical framework able to model the conflict of
interests faced by different players in each circumstance above-mentioned and examine
the possible solutions with a precise depiction of their properties [1]. Clearly, this is our
justification of using game theory as the principal method employed in our research. It
clearly shows that the realization of the ultimate of interconnection between any mobile
devices, anytime, anywhere (ubiquitous) in life is not possible if the efficient connection
and security mechanisms were not designed to stimulate nodes’ participation or provide
sufficient incentives to all network entities. Therefore, a network protocol at all layers
must take into account the heterogeneity of sub-network components, interfacing
between different MANETs and components and finally, the self-interest of autonomous
nodes performing separate optimization. Cooperation among wireless multi-hop ad hoc
nodes can also protect a network from malicious attacks. The absence of a central
authority, trusted entity, new and different classes of distributed security mechanisms and
privacy protections require cooperation among several mobile nodes to protect and secure
a network from malicious attacks [8]. This dissertation addresses selfish and malicious
nodes present in MANETs. The interconnection among highly mobile nodes, cooperation
in resource sharing, and network security is studied and solutions are investigated.
1.1

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The evolvement from traditional wired to wireless networks has brought a shift in the
primary concerns which need to be addressed for ad hoc wireless networks. Like their
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wired counterparts, wireless networks are interested in high throughput and low-cost
design, network priorities will dictate a tradeoff for an increase in power efficiency and
bandwidth optimization. The mobility of the node increases the primary concerns with
the connectivity and moving patterns. The more confidently a node shares its resources
with other nodes belonging to the same network; the more secure is the network and their
applications. Our research stems from the recognition that mobile autonomous nodes with
different intent will remain elusive unless a MANET with incentive mechanism is
developed. The presence of selfish nodes in a mobile heterogeneous ad hoc network
where autonomous put their own objectives ahead of the overall network objectives must
be modified due to the fact that network protocols do not have a better control of the node
mobility and the network operations. This dissertation involves the mechanism design,
implementation, analysis and simulation evaluation of the resource allocation model and
security strengthening model of strategic interactions in mobile ad hoc wireless multi-hop
networks with selfish and malicious users using the game theoretic framework.
Specifically, our investigative objective of this research is threefold:
1. Design distributed game theoretic algorithms using only local information to
enforce nodes cooperation at the network routing layer and optimize network
performance with autonomous nodes, and imperfect monitoring.
2. Investigate and propose satisfactory game theoretic solutions to the remarkable
enhance in bandwidth demand and throughput due to an increase of the number of
mobile devices.
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3. Use game theory to analyze new security mechanisms for MANETs with
autonomous nodes without a trusted authority or a central manager to strengthen
the overall network.
Specially, our work focuses on:
-

The study of various techniques for incorporating arbitration monitoring,
incomplete information into the game model for networks using game theory.

-

Evaluating the performance of models developed using game theory and
investigating the underlying assumptions of those theories in the context of ad hoc
networks with mobile nodes and dynamic change in the network topology.

-

Designing a game theoretic algorithm for autonomous networks that achieve
performance similar to those of cooperative networks with a central authority.

-

Providing and detailing mathematical analysis of ad hoc network security models
to capture in a general contest the equilibrium conditions in the MANET.

-

Predicting the user and provider behaviors under diverse type of noise conditions.

-

Simulating the designed models with known conventional software and tools that
will allow any researcher to replicate the results if deem necessary.

1.2

SIGNIFICANCE

This research has an unprecedented impact in several areas. First, our work on
cooperation enforcement at the routing layers provides significant insight into the
problem of distributed decision-making, random mobility, random neighboring
interactions, self-healing, self-organizing, and the resource proficiency needed to deal
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with rapid topology changes of the network. Our approach leads to a precise
characterization of the properties of cooperation in MANETs.
Second, this research establishes solid frameworks for integrating practical network
conditions into autonomous mobile network models. Practically, we mean incorporating
random mobility, real arbitration monitoring, and private information into the model. Our
research allows the self-interest of individual nodes to be in agreement with the overall
interest network performance. Furthermore, as with traditional networks, autonomous
networks need to be secured to authenticate the nodes, avoid exploitation, identify
abnormality, and protect user’s private data.
Our research provides novel concepts and fundamental knowledge concerning the
modeling, mechanism design, analysis, and simulation of complex dynamic systems,
including distributed autonomous network security. This work evaluates distributed
security mechanism adequate for mobile ad hoc networks. Evidently, this research
strengthens the interconnection of mobile autonomous devices in cyberspace for the
peace of mind of each user.
1.3

ORGANIZATION AND CONTRIBUTION

The work in this dissertation is divided into several chapters. We have introduced the
background, challenges, research objectives and approaches of this dissertation. The
remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. We review the comprehensive
literature works related to mobile ad hoc networks and game theory that will provide an
understanding and significant analysis of the tremendous contribution of the scientific
world within the domain in chapter 2.
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In chapter 3, we tackle the issue of dynamics of data delivery in MANETs using the
bargaining game theoretic approach. The mobility of nodes makes it difficult to have a
better timeframe when two nodes are in transmission range on top of the volatility of the
wireless communication. The presence of selfish nodes in the path of routing to
destination renders packet forwarding extremely weak. We model the dynamic packet
forwarding problem as a modified Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game. In our model, a
mobile player negotiates with the other mobile node to obtain an agreeable and
respectable sharing rule of packet forwarding based on its own resource available, such
that a node should not agree to forward packets without the energy or storage capacity to
do so. We also consider finite horizon of the bargaining game because of the mobility of
the nodes and the rupture of communication due to their velocity. The solution obtained
from bargaining ensures that a mobile device always finds a peer to help forward packets
in order to keep the network at flow.
In Chapter 4, the mobility that causes the topology changes provides to selfish nodes the
ability to move around and not being participative to the overall network objectives. In
order to incentivize in packet forwarding, an arbitrator is tasked to negotiate with nodes
in need of data transfer. The arbitrator is considered like a temporary cluster head and the
nodes in need of service are one hop away from the cluster head. The negotiation game is
applied with one-way offer by the arbitrator and the players either accept or reject the
offer. There is no alternating between players, only the arbitrator makes offers. The
generate offers follows the Dirichlet distribution.
In chapter 5, security and trust are considered in cyberspace. Three types of entities are
interacting in the game, the users, the service providers and the attackers. The attackers
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launch attacks on the service provider’s infrastructure in order to breach the system and
compromise the users’ privacy and private information. On the other hand, the service
provider needs to invest in security and protect users’ privacy and personal data and also
provider’s private information. Users need to feel that their private information are not or
will not be compromised by an insecure provider infrastructure in order to do business. A
prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) is implemented and equilibrium strategies are drawn. In
Chapter 6, the mobility that causes the topology changes provides to selfish nodes the
ability to move around and not being too participative to the overall network objectives.
In order to incentivize nodes in packet forwarding, a selected arbitrator is tasked to
negotiate with nodes in need of data transfer. Because of the collusion of selfish nodes
may cause the drainage of energy power for any node bargaining against a colluder. The
arbitrator has the difficult task based on historic data, to avoid node that has the pattern of
rejecting offers. The negotiation game is also applied with one-way offer by the arbitrator
and the players either accept or reject the offer. There are no alternating offers between
players, only the arbitrator makes offers. Chapter 7 deals with resource allocation in
cyberspace by using the Markov decision process (MDP) approach. The goal is to defend
a system against cyber-attack using several independent methods. A two-way division is
agility and recovery. Cyber agility pursues attack avoidance techniques such that cyberattacks are rendered as ineffective; whereas cyber recovery seeks to fight-through
successful attacks. Recovery should be an essential point during implementation because
the frequency of attacks will degrade the system and a quick and fast recovery is
necessary. However, there is not yet an optimum mechanism to allocate limited cyber
security resources into the different layers.
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Finally, in Chapter 8, we discuss our achievements, the limitations of the current
outcomes including the simulation constraints, identify future research directions and
conclude this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2:
RELATED WORK
A wireless ad hoc network is a self-organized network formed by peer nodes for common
purpose without a pre-existing infrastructure as the backbone of such a network.
Henceforth, data is exchanged between nodes by the sole effort of communicating nodes
deployed with transmission capabilities. Nodes serve as routers to relay data in case the
source and the destination are out of transmission range. The nature of no infrastructure
communication in ad hoc networks requires nodes in the network to cooperate for the
network to remain operational. However, some nodes may refrain from forwarding data
packets of other nodes to preserve their limited energy resources. In addition to
selfishness, other factors can degrade quality of cooperation. These factors include
mobility and environmental obstructions. In this Chapter, we provide a brief survey of
related research in the area. We review the research work on encouraging cooperation in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). We focus on research that aimed to overcome
selfishness of autonomous nodes by providing incentives to participants for cooperating.
We review the different cooperation approaches that have been proposed in the literature
and focus on game theory as the domain of our contribution in this dissertation. Each
approach is summarized and we identify their problems and limitations.
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Figure 2.1: A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET).

2.1

MANETS COOPERATION SCHEMES

Most of the literature review on encouraging, stimulating or enforcing cooperation in
MANETs can be divided into two main categories: credit-based (a.k.a. price-based or
virtual currency) [10] [11] [19] and reputation-based [3] [4] [12] [13]. The credit
exchange in virtual currency systems, the distribution of reputation information and the
reliability on promiscuous listening among neighboring nodes in reputation-based
systems raise some issues regarding the scalability of the above approaches.
2.1.1

Credit-Based Schemes

In credit-based schemes, nodes use virtual currency to pay for packet forwarding
services. Intermediate nodes charge for the relay service they are providing as a form of
incentive for cooperation. The two most popular approaches using the virtual currency
schemes as incentive are the Nuglet and Sprite. The authors in [10] proposed the Nuglets,
a virtual currency to stimulate cooperation in self-organized MANETs. Two models are
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proposed to stimulate cooperation: the packet purse model and the packet trade model.
For the packet trade model, the destination node pays for the packet-forwarding expenses.
Moreover, each intermediate node along the path to destination buys and sells packets to
be forwarded all the way to the destination. When a packet reaches its final destination,
the destination node buys and owns the packet. Hence, there is an incentive to cooperate
by intermediate nodes with a return on investment while spending their resources in
packet forwarding. The limitations and issues of this approach are: the sender may not
filter the type of message to send out and overloads the network, which may cause
congestion. To solve the issue, the packet purse approach is modeled. In this model, the
source node pays to send a packet to a destination node by loading some Nuglets in the
“packet’s purse”. Each intermediate node along the path acquires some Nuglets from the
packet before forwarding to the next hop or intermediary node. The packet is dropped
from the network if there are not enough Nuglets for the service rendered. Tamper
resistant software and hardware are required for both models to store the correct amount
of Nuglets. Another issue includes the fact that at the moment of forwarding, a packet an
intermediary (autonomous) node can decide to charge more, which will cause the packet
not to have enough Nuglets to reach its destination.
The authors in [20] proposed Sprite. Sprite relies on a central authority: the Credit
Clearance Service (CCS). Nodes keep a log (receipt) of all transactions they participate
in. The logs are submitted to the CCS for clearance and to claim payment. The CCS
determines the credit of each intermediate node and the cost to the sender. Sprite
cautiously computes payment to prevent cheating and collusion among nodes. Unlike
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Nuglets, Sprite does not require tamper proof hardware. However, the CCS as a central
authority violates the premise of MANETs and may become a target for security threats.

2.1.2

Reputation Based Schemes

In reputation-based schemes, a node’s decision to cooperate with other nodes with packet
forwarding impacts its own reputation. This decision is made by maintaining reputation
information about other nodes in the network by tracking their behavior towards others.
Reputation information is usually shared in the network using periodically exchanged
messages. Unlike the credit-based scheme, which provides direct incentives to
cooperating nodes, reputation-based instead punishes non-cooperating nodes. A noncooperative node will have a bad reputation and nodes with good reputation will punish
them by not forwarding their packets. Reputation information is collected at two levels:
first-hand and second-hand. In the latter, second-hand reputation schemes [12] [13],
nodes use direct and indirect observations to compute their reputation information bases.
For indirect observations, information is conveyed to a node via its neighbors, it’s not
collected by its own effort. We have promiscuous listening to neighbors' behavior, which
is used to collect indirect reputation information, like in [3]. However, relying on
information conveyed by others may not be completely accurate because of multiple
factors, such as imperfect monitoring or hidden terminal issue. Although second-hand
schemes incur an overhead in exchange of the reputation information collected,
misbehavior report can be detected faster than first-hand systems. In first-hand schemes
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[13], a node relies only on its own observations to evaluate the cooperation of other nodes
and compute the reputation information.
Different systems have used the reputation model, in particular, the Beta reputation
system [12] with a strong statistical background. A watchdog mechanism implemented
on each node is used to monitor the behavior of its neighbors. After a packet is sent, the
node equipped with an omnidirectional antenna listens and observes. If the packet has
been forwarded by its neighbor or not, the result is recorded in a reputation table.
Depending on the model implemented, models can share reputation information or not by
applying the second hand information. Nevertheless, second-hand information improves
the algorithm by accelerating its convergence time. However, second hand information
overhead creates traffic load on the network. For different models implemented, there are
also different weights assigned for new and old information. Assigning more weight to
new information, cooperating nodes may lose their reputation in low network activity.
Meanwhile, assigning more weight to old information, a malicious node may decide to
accumulate a good reputation first, then start dropping packets without any punishment.
Noted also, all packet loss is due to a node misbehavior. Thus, packet losses due to
congestion in the network or noise in signal received are not taken into consideration.
Michiardi and Molva in [4] developed CORE (COllaborative REputation). It’s a
reputation mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks. Three types of reputation mechanism
are used: we have a subjective reputation from first-hand information, then the indirect
reputation from second-hand information, and third a functional reputation calculated in
conjunction with different functions like forwarding and routing. The combination of
reputation information is an issue in itself; reputation composite does not allow the
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mechanism to trust a node for one of its specific functions. The assigned weight to each
function can be problematic. Moreover, to avoid a denial of service, only positive
reputation information is propagated. However, a coalition of malicious nodes may
propagate positive reputation of each other and gain longer access in the network. CORE
is simulated using the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol and shows prominent
performance results. Marti et al [22] proposed a combination system of a watchdog
system and a pathrather that selects the best route to avoid malicious nodes. The system
achieves an acceptable throughput in the presence of misbehaving nodes. However, this
system does not get rid of misbehaving nodes. Malicious nodes can send their own
packets in the network, even though they do not forward packets of other nodes.
Buchegger et al [2] proposed Cooperation Of Nodes-Fairness In Dynamic Ad hoc
NeTworks (CONFIDANT). CONFIDANT detects and quarantines misbehaving nodes.
The CONFIDANT protocol is made of four components: the monitoring, the reputation,
the path manager, and the trust manager. The monitoring is similar to the watchdog
defined above, the reputation structure rates nodes, the trust manager issues Alarm
messages on node behavior, and the path manager makes decisions when conflict occurs.
CONFIDANT propagates only negative information. The authors’ argument is that the
malicious behavior is not the norm, but an exception. However, the protocol can allow
misbehaving nodes to mount erroneous accusation attacks and cause the dismissal of
cooperating nodes from the network.
The Reputation-based Framework for Sensor Networks (RFSN) is introduced in [13].
First and second-hand information are used for reputation. Only the first-hand
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information is propagated in the network as shared reputation. Moreover, to prevent
misbehaving nodes to propagate false information (bad-mouthing attacks), only positive
information is propagated. A combination of first-hand and second-hand information is
used to obtain a new reputation value, Dempster-Shafer belief theory is used [13]. This
takes into account the fact that reputation information from the most trusted nodes must
have more weight. Nodes with low reputation are considered malicious and quarantined
from the networks. Aging is used to give more weight to fresh information. Thus,
cooperating nodes can lose their reputation in a network with low activity.
2.1.3

Other Schemes

To avoid the disadvantage of both credit-based and reputation-based system, researchers
have exploited the fact that nodes in the network are autonomous and the device has
limited resources. By combining both features in a node, there will always be a situation
of conflict in interests. Some nodes in the network will always want to take advantage of
the situation which is a rational behavior whenever there is no central authority in a
group. The use of game theoretic modeling is convenient to analyze cooperation with
incentives among nodes in the networks. In [1], the authors use game theory to analyze
cooperation incentives provided by the type of cooperation schemes, and propose a
hybrid system that offers strong incentives to encourage cooperation while ensuring
quick and effective detection of selfish nodes.
Researchers in other work focus on horizontal improvements by enhancing features that
are shared by most of the schemes in the literature. In [23], the proposed scheme avoids
the need to maintain traces of past interactions. It permits to avoid tracking available
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credit and reputation information in credit-based and reputation-based systems,
respectively.
The model aims to tag cooperative nodes in the network. Since cooperation between
nodes will gain higher payoffs than selfish ones, the others will tend to join the
cooperative group, with the assumption that nodes are rational. Subsequently, cooperative
nodes will take over the population. In the next sections, we provide an introduction to
basic concepts in game theory and their application to encourage cooperation in wireless
networks. We, then, shed more light on bargaining game theory, and review the research
work in the area of cooperation modeling in MANETs.
2.2

GAME THEORY

Game theory (GT) is a branch of applied mathematics that studies strategic interactions
among rational players who look for best strategies to maximize their personal gain in
response to others' strategies [1] [29] [30]. GT cannot be utilized to model irrational
misbehavior of faulty components. Nonetheless, it is an adequate tool to analyze and
mitigate selfish and malicious behaviors. Studying cooperation in MANETs using game
theory provides a more comprehensive understanding of the process. In MANETs, the
players are the nodes. Each node wants to maximize its own utility (payoff). In a game, a
player decides whether to cooperate or not based on its evaluation of the prospective
benefits and costs of cooperation and the expected strategies of other players in the
network. Which means, send the most possible number of packets and forward the least
number of packets while saving energy and bandwidth. A node's preferences are
expressed in the form of a utility function that includes all factors that contribute to its

20

satisfaction. The utility function reflects the node's objectives as it selects an action in
response to the actions selected by other players. The main objective in a network is the
convergence to a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium. However, the challenge is that the
allocations in the Nash equilibrium are not always Pareto efficient [31]. Here are some
approaches that use game theory.
2.2.1

Cooperative Models

In cooperative games, players within the game cooperate to achieve common benefits.
The most commonly used forms of cooperative games are coalitional games, in which
nodes form coalitions that share benefits and follow common strategies. These coalitions
compete with each others as opposed to individuals in non-cooperative games. Since
coalition members follow agreed-on strategies to obtain shared benefits, there is an
interest in the value of a coalition as an entity, which is the total amount of utility it can
obtain as a whole, as compared to the payoff every member obtains by affiliating with a
coalition [6]. The way the coalition value is divided among coalition members
distinguishes transferable utility games (TU) from non-transferable utility games (NTU).
In TU games, there is no restriction on the way utility can be divided among coalitional
members. The clearest and simplest example of a unit of transfer for utility is money.
Resource allocation in wireless networks is modeled as transferable utility game in [53],
and grand coalition is shown to be stable in many cases. On the other hand, the payoff an
individual player obtains in an NTU game depends on some factors, and among them is
the coalition structure and formation sequence. In [31], the authors model cooperative
spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks as a non-transferable coalitional game, and
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use a simple merge and split algorithm to optimize coalition formation. We provide a
more detailed discussion of features and solution concepts of coalitional game problems
in the next section.
2.2.2

Non-Cooperative Models

In non-cooperative games, nodes strategically react individually to others' interactions
based on the assessment of their own benefit. Jade et al. [32] combined credit-based
and Stochastic Game Theory to formulate an optimal policy to forward packets towards
route in peer-to-peer mobile networks. A source node requests data from the destination,
each intermediate node that relays a packet is remunerated with a currency token. Their
optimal policy is achieved based on cost, free bandwidth, and service capacity. The
incentive-based routing protocol implemented shows a better performance when
compared to the DSR protocol. Srinivasan et al. [21] motivated cooperation in a network
by using Generous Tit For Tat (GTFT). The authors showed that GTFT is a Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the forwarding game. However, each node must know all nodes in
the network in order to compute the equilibrium of the game. For a MANET, the notion
of each node to know all nodes available is a strong requirement for distributed networks.
Yan et al. [18] [19] proposed models for cooperation in wireless multi-hop networks by
using the prisoners’ dilemma game (PDG) as the base of their model. The assumption is
that, any two neighbors have a uniform network traffic demand that is not always the case
in real network. The authors in [13] used game theory and graph theory to investigate and
prove the conditions under which, cooperation among nodes can evolve in the network.
The authors concluded that the probability to have all nodes in the network cooperating is
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very small. Nevertheless, local subsets of cooperating nodes may exist. The model relies
on a dependency loop. Even though, each node is only aware of its neighbors as opposed
to the full network topology. Obviously, dependency loop will not be common
knowledge among nodes. To reach a Nash equilibrium point in a non-cooperative game
could be desirable because it guarantees stability among rational players [30]. A noncooperative game is said to be in a NE state if no single player can be better off by
changing its own strategy while other players remain unchanged. However, if at least two
players colluded, they might be better off by changing their strategies, but this is outside
the scope of non-cooperative games. In [6], the authors investigated equilibrium
conditions for packet forwarding strategies in wireless ad hoc networks, but they restrict
their study to static configurations, i.e., no mobility is applied on the nodes.
Yu et al [17] proposed a game theoretic approach to a secure cooperation in ad hoc
network. Comparably, a mechanism design has been used to enforce node cooperation
and develop optimal and truthful routing mechanism. By definition, a mechanism design
is a field of game theory that investigates how privately known preference of several
strategic players can be aggregated toward a desirable outcome. The desirable outcome is
sometimes the maximization of some utility function or to have strategic players
truthfully reveal their private information.
2.3

BARGAINING GAME THEORY

Cooperative game theory abstracts from the procedures and details of reaching an
outcome and focuses on the possibility of reaching an agreement. It studies the
frictionless negotiations among rational players who can make binding agreements with
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or without the need to enforce by means of punishment on the rule of the game.
Commitments are fully binding and enforceable.
The bargaining formal theory was introduced by John Nash in his research papers [33].
The final outcome is the main interest and it is often convenient to analyze the domain of
all outcomes in order to uncover an efficient outcome. The desirable solution is
expressible in terms of axioms, which ideally should incorporate some fairness and
efficient features to the solution. A bargaining problem is represented as a pair (S, d) in
the utility space. The point of disagreement represents the minimum utility level that
players will obtain if negotiations fail. The set S must include points that dominate the
disagreement point. However, there is a positive surplus to be divided among the players
once their minimum requirements are reached. The main question to be asked usually is
“How the surplus should be divided?”. The strategic bargaining describes what the
outcome will be and the axiomatic bargaining emphasizes on how negotiations can
evolve to reach an outcome.
In [29], strategic bargaining studies the exact specification of the negotiation procedure
such as the periodicity of each exchange, the duration of communication between the
players, the discount or threat each time an agreement is not reached. It helps identify the
behavior of the players. As a strategic bargaining procedure, we have the RubinsteinStåhl’s model of alternating offers [1] [29]. The negotiation is modeled very closely to a
real-time game. Suppose there are two players bargaining over the division of a surplus
of 1. In the period 1, Player 1 will make an offer on the division (x, 1-x). Player 2 can
either reject or accept the offer. If the offer is accepted, the bargaining game ends. If the
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offer is rejected, then Player 2 will make a proposal on the next period. Therefore, Player
1 will respond. The negotiation continues until an outcome is reached or the threat or
discount factor brings the game to an end.
The axiomatic bargaining [30] assumes some desirable properties about the outcome of
the negotiation process and then identifies process rules that will guarantee the outcome.
The bargaining process is ignored completely. The Nash bargaining solution specifies
four axioms [33], to be should satisfy:
i.

Symmetry: Two players bargaining for a better payoff with symmetric utilities get
the same payoff. It ensures that the solution yields a fair outcome for any player.

ii.

Pareto Optimality: The solution is on the Pareto boundary. The axiom reflects the
rationality of the players. Therefore, If players work together during the
negotiations, they would not accept the disagreement point as the outcome when
they can do better and reach an agreement.

iii.

Invariance with respect to affine transformation: In case the defined payoff
functions are rescaled, the obtained solution should be rescaled the same way. For
example, a change in valuation for the players’ utility implies a change in the
valuation of the outcome of the game.

iv.

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): Let’s suppose the solution for the
bargaining problem (S, d) is s*. By considering a new bargaining (S’, d), where
𝑆𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑆𝑆. Therefore, the solution of the new negotiation problem is also s*. The

solution obtained is independent of the “alternatives” that are deemed irrelevant
because they were not chosen in S, so their absence should not alter the outcome.
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Brahma et al [16] modeled the problem of dynamic spectrum access by a network of N
nodes as a perfect information infinite horizon bargaining game. Players negotiate among
themselves to agree upon a sharing rule of the channels. The authors investigated the
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the bargaining game, each player can maximize
its own throughput against other players. The impact of the discount factor is also taken
into consideration. However, the authors do not consider the possibility of players
bargaining with the intent of malice, a player does not willing to share equitably the
resource. Hassan et al [34] showed that users can apply a brinkmanship technique to
present credible threats to their provider by using an ultimatum bargaining game and
therefore, constraint the provider to allocate more resources to users’s services.
2.4

NETWORK SECURITY GAME

The use of game theory to address network security challenges has increased in recent
years. Generally, the main objective of a rational attacker is to intelligently choose its
strategy to maximize the damage to the network while the network administrator
strategies are to minimize the damage to the network. The attacker’s and the defender’s
objectives are diametrically opposed. Applying the zero-sum game to model network
security [38], where by definition, the winning of a player generates the loss of its
opponent. The game reaches the well known Nash equilibrium (NE) when, each player
applies the best response to its opponent strategy. Neither the attacker nor the network
administrator can unilaterally make a gainful deviation from the Nash equilibrium.
In the game presented in [8], strategies and payoffs are assumed to be common
knowledge to all players. The network security game is known as a game of complete
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information. Otherwise, the game is an incomplete information which can be formulated
as a Bayesian game as in [19]. The network security game can also be modeled as a static
game [30], a repeated game or generally as a stochastic game [8]. A stochastic game is a
generalization of a repeated game. In a repeated game, the game is played multiple times,
players play the same stage game in all periods, whereas in a stochastic game, the stage
game can randomly change from one period to the next. Game theory also provides a
solid framework to model intrusion detection in a network [41]. A survey of game theory
as applied to network security is provided in [42].
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CHAPTER 3
DYNAMICS OF DATA DELIVERY IN MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKS: A
BARGAINING GAME APPROACH

In this chapter, we address the problem of dynamic packet forwarding with a set of
wireless autonomous ad hoc network nodes, where each node acting in a selfish manner
tries to use the resource of other nodes. We model the dynamic packet forwarding
problem as a modified Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game. In our model, a mobile node
(player) negotiates with the other mobile node to obtain an agreeable and respectable
sharing rule of packet forwarding based on its own available resource, such that a node
should not agree to forward packets without the energy or storage capacity to do so. We
investigate and solve this bargaining process by finding the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE) strategies of the game. We consider finite horizon of the bargaining
game and examine its SPNE. The solution obtained from bargaining ensures that a
mobile device always finds a peer to help forward packets in order to keep the network at
flow. Extensive simulations using OMNET++ simulation frameworks are conducted to
evaluate how the level of participation of each mobile node may impact the overall
network performance. Simulation results show that our proposed bargaining game
scheme performs better than other resource shared algorithms, namely the technique for
order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) and the bargaining game based
access network selection for heterogeneous network.
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3.1

INTRODUCTION

In mobile wireless heterogeneous networks such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs),
the main focus is on cooperation among mobile nodes. Whereas, mobile nodes are mainly
constrained by the limits of their energy power, computational and transmission range,
and also selfish node that may not be willing to fully cooperate with the overall network.
Specifically, the limited energy and transmission range of a node encourage not to forward
another node’s data packet given that the packet forwarding task consumes lots of energy.
Unless, there is an incentive for greedy nodes to be participative in another node’s packet
forwarding. Therefore, it may be in the node’s best interest to participate in order to
extend the network lifetime. However, refusal to be part of another node packet
forwarding will severely hinder overall network reliability and degrade the node’s own
performance. Hence, it is essential to implement a mechanism that will motivate packet
forwarding among nodes.
The novel mechanism proposed in this chapter is a bargaining theoretical game
between a mobile source node and its intermediary to provide resource in reaching an
access point (AP). Whenever a mobile node generates packets to be forwarded to the
nearest AP, the selected intermediary mobile node bargains and the transfer of data-packet
occurs only if the splitting rule is agreed upon between players. Until the nodes agree upon
the splitting rule, none of the mobile devices can start data transfer. Thus, this “delay” of
the bargaining transaction also costs the node in terms of energy. Consideration of this
cost is conducted by discounting future payoff of the node. The discount factor represents
the perseverance of the node in waiting for the bargaining result to its favor.
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The bargaining game is analyzed using backward induction and we investigated the
SPNE strategies with the player in the game. The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
comprises a set of strategies such that, no player in a subgame can deviate from these
strategies and gain a better payoff. The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We model the splitting rule which is agreed upon by each player before any data
communication starts and this is performed without the need of an arbitrator or central
manager.
• We model the problem of dynamic data delivery, where mobile nodes need to agree on
the splitting rule of data packet among themselves using the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining
game while in movement with the optimism not to lose wireless communication.
Prior work in the area by researchers are summarized and limitations are also
introduced. Rasheed et al [43] proposed a 3-tier security framework for authentication
between mobile sinks and sensor nodes based on a polynomial pool-based key predistribution scheme. Improvements are also made in security performance against a
stationary access node replication attack. Munir et al. [44] proposed a multi-tier
architecture for mobile wireless sensor network (WSN) as a key element of the future
ubiquitous computing paradigm. The mobile WSN is also discussed with integration into
a pervasive network and an analysis of the impact of mobility on performance related
issues. Ren et al. [xx] explored the impact of multiple mobile sinks on end-to-end packet
delay and energy depletion. Tradeoffs are considered to optimize both packet delay and
energy consumption. Purposely, deploying multiple sinks that are moving randomly, they
investigated the impact of sink number, speed, sink transmission radius, and data routing
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on performance. Basagni et al [28] effectively improved the lifetime of a WSN. A
mathematical model is defined to take into account realistic parameters.
Niyato et al. [45] proposed an evolutionary game theoretic approach to solve the
access network selection problem in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). The handoff to
another network is dynamically handled by the users. The mobility-based method
presented in [6] can be categorized as mobile-sink and mobile-relay methods, depending
on the type of the mobile entity. Mobile entities can gather the data from the nodes by
using sensor short radio transmission range, which is an efficient way of communication
with respect to energy.
The authors in[6] evaluated the use of Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) for ranking candidate access networks in heterogeneous
networks. Liou et al. [24] proposed a bargaining game based access network selection
scheme for call requests in HetNet. The bargaining game considered some parameters
such as the preference of the candidate access network to the call request.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the system models. Section 3.3
presents the game formulation. Section 3.4 analyzes the bargaining for resource allocation.
Section 3.5 presents the bargaining with N players. Performance evaluation results are
presented in section 3.6, while conclusions and future works are drawn in Section 3.7.
3.2

SYSTEM MODELS

In this section, we present the system models including the problem description, the
network model, and the mobility model.
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3.2.1

Problem Description

We assume a MANET of N nodes indexed from 1 to N deployed in a wide area. A
Node is mounted on a vehicle moving in a specific pattern. Each node can be a mobile
router or a mobile broadcast access point. Since we have an infrastructureless network,
communication between two distant nodes or an access point becomes a challenge. Nodes
can be geographically isolated from other nodes, but they are within transmission range
from one another. The packet-forwarding problem of selfish nodes is problematic.
Incentive and reward are a motivation for greedy nodes to use their energy to relay the
data of other nodes. Also, a gain maximization is obtained by always relaying data from
many nodes and to allocate the limited resources (storage) to a maximum number of
mobile nodes at the same time.
3.2.2

Network Model

As shown in Figure 3.1, the MANET consists of multiple wireless local area networks
(WLANs) based on IEEE 802.11 standards and multiple access points (APs). A
Transmission device mounted on a vehicle (bicycle, taxicab, car, police cruiser, fire
truck, helicopter, etc.) is considered a mobile unit. APs are deployed all over the WLAN
as a data repository for all data collected.
3.2.3

Mobility Model

The movement of mobile devices is seen as random on a 3-dimensional plane. To
model the mobility, the commonly used random waypoint (RWP) [66] model is similar
and close to reality. The mobile node moves randomly and freely without restrictions. The
waypoints are random vectors uniformly distributed in the service area.
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A mobile node maintains the same speed when moving between two random
waypoints. In each time intervals the speeds are independently and identically distributed
(IID). When a mobile device arrives at a waypoint, it may stop or change its velocity but,
any change of speed is broadcasted to its neighbors.
3.3

GAME FORMULATION

We present in this section, the method and constraint used to select the best candidate
among the neighbors for the bargaining game. The source node which is in need of data
forwarding service broadcasts its request to all of its neighbors. Before any eventual
candidate reply to the request, there are prerequisites such as the direction of the
movement of the mobile device, the speed, and the available storage needed for packet
forwarding.
3.3.1

Energy and Signal Strength Constraint

An intermediary node can volunteer its service only if it has the minimal resource
requirements to carry out the work. Let us assume the source node s transmits its
information to the destination node d with power P d . and a minimum energy spent E s . The
intermediary node should guarantee at least the threshold needed in term of energy E i (E s
≤ E i ) and a power P i to transmit (P d ≤ P i ) data with a signal to noise ratio (SNR) held to a
minimum.
3.3.2

Communication Traveling Time Constraint

Consider two mobile devices within a distance d that are in radio transmission range
T R , (d ≤ T R ).
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Figure 3.1: Example of mobile ad hoc network, nodes are mounted on vehicles. Source
and access point (AP) need intermediary node to be reachable.
Let T eta denotes the elapsed time of both mobile devices from their first communication
to them before running out of transmission range. Let u be the vector that represents the
trajectory of the mobile source device. Let v be the vector of point of origin for the source
device and directed toward the destination device point represented by the intermediary
mobile device. The inner product of two vectors denotes by < u, v >. Denote the norm of
vector u by ||u|| and norm of vector v by ||v||. Let θ be the angle between vectors u and v.
Following the base of linear algebra,
cos(θ ) =

< u , v > and sin(θ ) = 1 − cos 2 (θ )
|| u || * || v ||

(3.1)

Define the handoff point to be the points in which both mobile devices are distant from
each other of D (D > T R ).
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(a) V 1 ≠ V 2 , θ={0, π}, same
direction

(b) θ≠{0, π}, perpendicular
direction

Figure 3.2: The total travel distance of MDs before being out of range.
During the communication traveling time (T eta ), if a mobile device changes its speed,
the overall time will be an arithmetic summation based on each segment of distance with
constant and uniform speed, then Fig. 2 shows that T eta , is calculated as
Teta =
Teta =

D−d
, forV2 > V1
|| V2 || − || V1 ||

D+d
, forV1 > V2
|| V1 || − || V2 ||

Teta =

(3.2)



D cos(θ1 ) + d
,...V1 ⊥ V2
|| V1 ||

Firstly, in traditional direct transmission, the sender transmits its information to the
destination with power P d . To achieve the minimal link quality γ, transmitted power has to
be sufficiently large for the SNR that the destination received satisfies
SNRd =

Pd Gs ,d

σ

≥γ

(3.3)

where σ is the noise level and G s,d is the path loss from source to destination, and γ is the
SNR threshold of the destination.
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Secondly, we consider the transmission case of a receiver on the move. While a source
receives information from neighbors, the selection of the best candidate is based on all
information received such as the location, speed/velocity, direction, and signal strength.
If the mobile device choice is always based on the mobile node moving to same
direction and closest speed, then the large dwelling time implies more packets will be
forwarded through the same mobile node. Thus, the network will experience higher
throughput and the node will experience less delay in packet forwarding.
3.4

BARGAINING FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION

A cooperative game in which players improve their payoffs through negotiation is also
known as bargaining game [1]. We model the resource allocation problem as an infinite
horizon Rubinstein- Ståhl bargaining game [29]. Both players must agree on the splitting
rule before the data communication starts. In our model, player 1 has data packets to be
forwarded to the AP. The requester prefers to obtain as much resources as possible in
order to improve its QoS level; player 2 has the resource storage to forward the data
packet but prefers to keep as much resource as possible in order to accept more requests
from other mobile devices in need for data forwarding in the near future.

Periods

Offerer (Source Node)

Receiver (Mobile node)

1

K-1

1

2

K-Kδ+δ

Kδ-δ

3

K-Kδ+Kδ2-δ2

Kδ-Kδ2+δ2

4

K-Kδ+Kδ2-Kδ3+δ3

Kδ-Kδ2+Kδ3-δ3
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…

…

…

p

K-Kδ+Kδ2-Kδ3-…+δp-1

Kδ-Kδ2+Kδ3-…+δp-1

Table 3.1: Subgame Perfect Equilibria: Horizontal lines represent the period of each session, then
the splitting of player 1 and 3rd column is the part of the receiver (player 2).

The bargaining game proceeds in “time-periods” in which one player proposes a
splitting rule to the other player who can “accept” or “reject” the offer. Let x be the
amount of resources player 1 could obtain during the request of the bargaining game. Let y
be the amount of resources available that player 2 could keep or spare by not offering
them to the requester and available in near future to other requester. Denote K as the total
amount of resource available to player 2, K-x = y. In periods 0, 2, 4, …, 2k (where p =0, 1,
2, …) player 1 proposes a splitting rule (x, K-x) to player 2 whom can accept or reject. The
game ends if an offer is accepted. In periods 2p+1, player 2 makes an offer to player 1.
We have an infinite horizon game of perfect information.
3.4.1

Payoffs

Let consider that if (x, K-x) is accepted by both players at period t, then the payoffs of
player 1 and 2 are δtx and δt(K-x) respectively. δ ϵ [0, 1] represents the discount factor of
the players. The discount factor is also a representation of the delay cost for achieving a
bargaining outcome for the players. There will be no data communication between
players, unless there is an agreement on the splitting rule. The cost of not reaching an
agreement is high for both players, because of the mobility of the players. There is a
possibility for a mobile device to be out of transmission range and start the bargaining all
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over again with another mobile device. A player values a resource more now than it values
the same resource in a future period. The decrease in value of the resource represents the
disappointment of the players for being unable to start forwarding data right away. As the
δ increases, the players become more anxious because of the volatility of the medium, and
time delay between two bargaining periods decreases.
The payoff of player 2 is also based on the ratio of the resources allocated to the
requester over the resource available to the receiver before the bargaining started, and the
energy lost during long bargaining sessions.
3.4.2

Nash Equilibrium

There are many Nash equilibrium (NE) in this game. Any strategy profile in which
player 1 splits its data load is a Nash equilibrium. Generally, splits of the overall K loads
of player 1 between both players correspond to a NE strategy profile. However, not all
profiles are a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). For example, if player 2 rejects first
offer of player 1 during period p=0 and offers player 1 a share x > δ(K-1) in the following
period, then that player should accept, because any share bigger than a previous rejected
share based on the worthiness of the share at the period.
3.4.3

Solutions of the Bargaining Games

Table I shows the SPE of games in different periods [3]. The unique SPE in the last
period or the period before the device goes out of range is for the player who makes the
offer. From the table, the SPE shares demanded by the players in an increasingly larger
period form a pattern. Depending on period p (odd or even), the SPE share demanded by
player i:
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p is even: the SPE split offered by player i is:
K (1 − δ + δ 2 − ... − δ

p −1

)=

K (1 − δ p )
+δ
1+ δ

p −1

(3.4)

Also, player i accepts any split equal to or less than:
K (1 + δ p −1 )δ
−δ
1+ δ



p −1

(3.5)

, δ ∈ [0,1]

p is odd: the SPE split demanded by player i is:
K (1 − δ + δ 2 − ... + δ

p −1

)=

K (1 + δ p )
−δ
1+ δ

p −1

(3.6)

Also, player i accepts any split equal to or less than:
K (1 − δ k −1 )δ
+δ
1+ δ

p −1

, δ ∈ [0,1]

(3.7)

Thus, the unique SPE solution of p periods (odd/even) is “Player i always offers a share
of (3.4) respectively (3.6) for odd values of p, and he accepts any share greater than to
(3.5) respectively (3.7) and rejects any smaller split.”
Let consider the case in which two mobile devices are in range for a longer period of time
which mean period p tends to infinity.
 K [1 − (−δ ) p ]

K
lim 
− (−δ ) p −1  ≈
p →∞
1+ δ

 1+ δ

(3.8)

Player i will not reject any split greater than:
 K [1 − (−δ ) p −1 ]δ

Kδ
lim 
+ (−δ ) p −1  ≈
p →∞
1+ δ

 1+ δ

(3.9)

3.4.4 Unicity of the SPE Solutions
According to the bargaining game theory [29], the safety payoff value of a player in a
game is the guaranteed amount the player can get in the bargaining game. Let m 1 and M 1
be player 1’s lowest and highest payoff values in any SPE where player 1 makes an offer.
Denote n 1 and N 1 be the lowest and highest payoff values for player 1 game in which
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player 2 makes the offer.
Player 1 makes an offer to player 2, player 2 will accept x such that his share of K-x
exceeds δN 2 , knowing that player 2 cannot expect more than M 2 in the continuation game
following his refusal. Thus, we have,
m 1 ≥ K- δM 2

(3.10)

Player 1will not reject a split of more than δM 1 .
M 2 ≥ K- δM 1

(3.11)

Player 2 will never offer a share greater than δM 1 . Thus, player 1’s continued payoff
when player 2 makes an offer is
N 1 ≥ δM 1

(3.12)

Since player 1 can obtain at least m 1 in the continuation game by rejecting player 2’s
offer, player 1 will reject any x such that x < δm 1 . Thus, we have n 1 ≥ δm 1
From [3], we can say that:
K
1+ δ

(3.13)

Kδ
1+ δ

(3.14)

m2 = M 2 =

And similarly, we also have
n2 = N 2 =

Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs between player 1 and player 2 in the
bargaining game are unique.
3.5 BARGAINING WITH N PLAYERS
With the intermediary device not willing to make available all of its resource to only
one source device, we will investigate the game with N players. We have N players
(mobile devices) which need to forward packets to the nearest AP. The intermediary node
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which carries the data acts like another player to have its share of the resources. Let P i
denote the player making an offer and let P -i = {R 1 , R 2 , …, R N-1 } be the players receiving
offers.
To avoid data lost by collision, a token is implemented. Players communicate only when
they are in possession of the token. A player P i makes an offer by proposing a splitting
rule (x 1 , x 2 ,…, x N-1 , x N ), where x i is the resource needs by player P i and x N = K-Σx i ,
i=1..N-1. P N represents the intermediary mobile device. For example, the P 1 splitting rule
is rejected by any P -1 players, then player P 2 is next to propose a splitting rule. In case all
players P -i accept their respective offers, the bargaining ends and the data transfer starts
[16] [6]

Require: # player, N=2; Time period before out of range, T; Payload, Q;
time transferring a packet, t; Cost factor, δ;
Initialization: Commitment level value for player 1 and 2 is c 1 and c 2
respectively;
1:

c 1 ← value; c 2 ← value;

2:

While T > 0 do

3:

Player 1 proposes z 1 and z 2 = Q – z 1 ; (z 1 , z 2 ) with z 1 ≥ c 1

4:

Player 2, accept ← (z 2 ≥ c 2 ; True, False)

5:

If !accept then

6:

T ← T – t; z 1 ← z 2 δ; z 2 ← Q – z 1 ;

7:

player 2 proposes z 2 ; (z 1 , z 2 ) with z 2 ≤ c 2

8:

player 1, accept ← (Q - z 2 ≥ c 1 ; True, False)

9:

If !accept then T←T–t; goto 4; Else Transfer Q; Break; End if

10:

Else Transfer Q; Break; End if
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4: z 1 ← z 2 δ; z 2 ← Q - z 1

11:
12:

End While

Table 3.2: Algorithm for Bargaining

Let define the payoff of the players. For an offer x i to be accepted in period t, the payoff
of P i is δtx i , δϵ[0, 1] is known as the discount factor (delay cost in achieving the
bargaining outcome).
3.5.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)
Consider P i , the player who makes the offer to players P -i . The token is distributed
following the round robin between all players. The SPE of the bargaining game; P i
demands of a split
(15)

K

∑

N
j =1

δ

j

The receivers of the offers P -i to share,
Kδ

(16)

p

∑ j =1 δ
N

j

Equations (15) and (16) show that the SPE shares of a player is K/N as δ tends to 1.
Since we are in a volatile environment with nodes moving randomly, there are chances for
nodes to be out of range. There is no patience for all players; there is no need to be
comfortable rejecting offers with hope for better. It may end up being a waste of precious
energy. It is insightful to think that player P N (carrier) gets a lesser fraction of the
resource. In our game, all players are anxious to find themselves out of range, combine
with the waste of energy. Therefore, players will aim for an equal distribution of the
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resources.
3.5.2 Resource Allocation Algorithm
The minimal acceptable share for a player is the only private information. Sharing
information that may cause others to not offer anything better during the bargaining
session. The algorithm in table II shows the resource allocation procedure players 1 and 2
will invoke when making an offer during bargaining.
3.6 SIMULATION RESULTS
We developed an OMNET++ [46] based simulation model for our proposed scheme.
The OMNET++ is a discrete-event network simulation framework. The goal of this
framework project is to develop a preferred and an open simulation environment for
networking research. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the simulation environment is a grid where
mobile nodes move following the north, south, east and west direction. The system
parameters for this MANET are provided in table 3.3. The mobile device’s speed is a
random variable which is uniformly distributed. The device mobility is randomly and
independently set from each other. The slot duration is set to be larger than packet
duration in order to keep the nodes in the network time-synchronized. These guard bands
are needed to compensate the arbitrary delays incurred by transmitted packets due to
signal propagation delays or clock drifts.
The proposed bargaining game scheme in this chapter is compared quantitatively with
the scheme of bargaining game based access network selection (BGANS) [24], and also
with the TOPSIS scheme [16] [26]. With the TOPSIS scheme, only mobile devices with
speeds lower than 2 m/s will see LANs as candidate access networks. In the BGANS
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approach, if the dwelling factors are larger, without taking into account the residual
energy; then there is a high possibility of handoff because of lower energy for
transmission.
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BGANS

Handoff Occurrence Ratio

The Proposed Scheme
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Figure 3.3. Handoff Occurrence Ratio
Figure 3.3 represents the handoff occurrence ratio. By definition, the handoff occurrence
ratio is the average number of handoffs that a mobile device tried each time to connect.
The proposed scheme has a better handoffs ratio compared to the TOPSIS and BGANS.
The improvement is about 60% lower than the BGANS and the BGANS is about 40%
lower than TOPSIS for an arrival rate of 0.1. The ratio improvement is due to that the
bargaining game takes into consideration the devices’ mobility, the time to remain
connected and mainly the availability of the resource to be allocated. The receiver of a
mobile device tends to allocate a portion of its resources based on section VI. A portion
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of a requested resource is always better than no resource at all. Meanwhile, the BGANS
tends to allocate more resource to requests with larger dwelling factors.
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Figure 3.4: Handoff Request Blocking Ratio
Figure 3.4 shows the handoff request blocking probability, defined as the probability that a
mobile device request for data communication fails to handoff to the intended mobile
node. The performance improvement for handoff request blocking is lower compared the
TOPSIS and BGANS schemes for about 25% for the BGANS scheme. Our proposed
scheme uses the fact that a mobile device is not isolated or clustered. A receiver mobile
device of the request has resources to allocate reason of the bargaining. Multiple requests
from different mobile nodes may cause channel interference and block a request to the
destination. The handoff request blocking ratio increases when the arrival rate goes over
the value of “1”. Hence, the mobility and the bargaining game scheme lower the handoff
blocking probability.
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Figure 3.5: New Request Blocking Ratio
The above figure 3.5 shows the new request blocking ratio/probability versus the arrival
request rate for mobile nodes connectivity. The proposed scheme shows an increase of the
new request blocking probability when the arrival rate is about 1.1, and this improvement
is based on the availability of a shared bargaining resource to be allocated. The nodes
solicited for data communication are not the same which reduces the probability of new
blocking request. The TOPSIS and the BGANS new request blocking probability tend to
the same result with different arrival request rate.
3.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, a bargaining-game algorithm has been proposed for the resource allocation
of mobile nodes in wireless mobile ad hoc networks. The algorithm is based on the
Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game model with the objective of maximizing the resources
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to be allocated to a mobile device in need. The bargaining game algorithm takes into
consideration multiple factors such as the general connection duration among mobile
devices, the mobility pattern, and the payload to transfer. Based on the experimental
results from the OMNET++ simulation framework, we found that the scheme proposed
may perform better than the TOPSIS and BGANS schemes in terms of the handoff
occurrence and request dropping probability per connection.
For future work, we plan to investigate this model further with a continuous-time which is
a more realistic model. We will explore the possibility of combining the bargaining game
with another game theoretic model to refine the payoffs of players.
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CHAPTER 4
GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN DYNAMIC
MULTI-HOPS NETWORKS WITH ARBITRATION

One of the major design issues in dynamic networks is the availability of resources
when in need. Because of the volatility of wireless connections in mobile ad-hoc
networks (MANETs), resource seems scarce when mobile devices need to forward
information on a dynamic network. A connection through a mobile node may not be
available because of the greediness of a selfish node. In this chapter, we address the issue
of dynamic packet forwarding by a set of wireless autonomous ad hoc network nodes.
Wireless nodes acting in a selfish manner try to use the resource of other nodes without
being participative. We model the dynamic packet forwarding problem as a negotiation
model game with an arbitrator. In our model, a group of mobile nodes (players) negotiate
with a mobile arbitrator to obtain an agreeable resource allocation based on a simple
majority rule to forward packets. The mobile arbitrator submits offers to each mobile
device in the group, whereas mobile nodes decide to agree or disagree on the offer. The
ultimate decision is made by simple majority. We investigate and solve the negotiation by
finding the optimal Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies of the game. We consider a
Dirichlet distribution offers on a finite volatile and a sporadic time limitation set of
mobile devices for the negotiation game. The solution obtained from negotiation ensures
that a mobile device always finds a peer or arbitrator to help forwarding packets in order
to keep the network flowing. Mathematical proofs and MATLAB simulations support our
model.
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4.1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been tremendous active research in deploying and supporting
terminal mobility in dynamic networks. One of the design issues is the resource allocation
and availability in ephemeral networks such as MANETs [49]. A MANET is a group of
autonomous mobile devices deployed without fixed infrastructures. In such a network
with a sporadic connectivity, the device mobility can be exploited for data dissemination,
and low link reliability is allowed for delay-tolerant applications. Although nodes may be
static or mobile, they rely on other nodes for data transfer. Furthermore, an autonomous
behavior and resource limitations such as in energy power may cause a node to be selfish.
Cooperation or participation to keep the network flowing is crucial among nodes in the
community or group [1]. Unless there is an incentive for greedy nodes to participate in
another node’s data transfer, it may not be in the node’s best interest to deplete its own
energy power. However, refusal to be part of packet forwarding will severely hinder
network reliability and degrade the node’s own performance. Thus, it is essential to
implement a mechanism that will motivate data transfer among nodes.
From the existing literature, researchers have proposed ways to stimulate a node’s
participation to strengthen network vitality. Many have discussed reward programs and
incentive mechanisms to ensure that a selfish behavior is not inhibiting [82]. However,
the need for an optimal solution is apparent in a volatile network which is a characteristic
of MANETs. The novel mechanism proposed in this chapter enforces a game-theoretic
model of communication among nodes. The model introduces a bargaining game with
arbitration between mobile source nodes (players) and the intermediary mobile node (the
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arbitrator). The arbitrator en route to the nearest access point (AP) invokes the negotiation
game with players whenever requests to forward packets are made. The arbitrator submits
a share of its resource availability to each player, and the players decide to agree or
disagree on their offers. The shared value is a random number generated from Dirichlet’s
distribution, which provides equitable outcomes for players. We investigate the NE
strategies and how optimal solutions are derived to allocate the shared resource to players.
The ultimate decision is based on a simple majority of players agreeing on their offers
[31]. If a simple majority is reached, mobile devices may transfer data. Otherwise, new
offers may be submitted again, and the cost of not reaching the majority vote is discounted
from the overall resource by a factor δ (δ < 1). Discounting successive payoffs represent
the perseverance of the players waiting for a better offer. If simple majority is not
ascertained by the final cycle, and at least one player is out of transmission range to end
the game.
The mobility and wider transmission range of the arbitrator make it ideal for data
transmission. Its mobility covers broader locations, while its wide transmission range
reduces the number of hops between a source node and its destination. As a result, the
arbitrator’s routing table is also up-to-date with the latest routes to destinations.
Furthermore, introducing the bargaining game with arbitration ensures there is an
incentive for nodes to cooperate in packet forwarding and expedite network reliability.
Some early research works exist in this area, and we summarize them here. In [50],
Buttyan and Hubaux introduced virtual currency as an incentive for nodes to cooperate
with each other. Intermediate nodes, for example, charge the source a ‘nuglet’ to transfer
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packet. Through the estimated route, the source allocates a set amount of ‘nuglets’ for a
packet to be delivered at destination. When an intermediate node routes packet to the next
node, it decrements the ‘nuglet’ count by one. This approach does not consider the
possibility of nodes charging more than a unit of currency, as well as packets dropping
when there are no more tokens available for payment.
Liou et al. [24] proposed a bargaining game based on a network selection access
scheme for call requests in heterogeneous networks. The bargaining game considers some
parameters, including a candidate’s preferred method of network access, such as wireless
metropolitan area networks, 3G/CDMA networks, and wireless local area networks, and
the mobility pattern of the mobile device. This approach requires the network
infrastructure to be static. The base stations are static while only the mobile devices are
moving.
Marti et al. [22] studied techniques for improving the throughput in MANET in the
presence of nodes that agree to forward packets but fail to deliver them. The authors
categorize nodes as watchdog nodes that identify misbehaving nodes and pathrater
nodes, which help routing protocols to avoid these nodes. The watchdog feature has the
ability to detect misbehaving nodes in a static neighborhood. However, it might not be
able to detect a compromised node in the presence of ambiguous collusion and false
behavior.
Niyato et al. [45] introduced an evolutionary game theoretic approach in resolving the
issue of network access selection in heterogeneous networks. The handoff to another
network is dynamically handled by the users. The mobility-based method presented in [6]
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can be categorized as mobile-sink and mobile-relay methods, depending on the type of
the mobile entity. Mobile entities can gather data from the nodes by using their short
radio transmission range, which is an efficient way of communication with respect to
energy.
Riordan and Grigoras [52] proposed a data mule service for mobile ad-hoc networks.
The work is based on a service-driven MANET. The client is a requester of a service, and
the provider of the service may no longer be on the same network due to mobility. The
mule is highly mobile, and it joins a large network to have the best chance of delivering
results to the requester. This approach involves the storage of multiple network
memberships and requires the mule to be the data transporter itself, which is good for
delay tolerant applications.
In this chapter, we are interested in resource allocation and optimization in
heterogeneous MANETs with devices in full mobility. This is obtained through the
proposition of bargaining games with an arbitrator applying the Dirichlet distribution.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the system
models and motivations. In Section 4.3, we propose the game theoretic analysis. Section
4.4 presents the negotiation with n players. Section 4.5 presents the simulation results
while conclusions and future works are drawn in Section 4.6.
4.2 SYSTEM MODELS AND MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we first present our system models under the problem description, our
motivations towards this work and the network model.
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4.2.1. Problem Description
We consider a scenario in MANET with N nodes indexed from 1 to N deployed in an
area. Nodes are fixed or mounted on a vehicle moving through various routes. Each node
can be a mobile router or a mobile broadcast access point. Each node also has the ability to
store, process and relay packets to other nodes if there is a need to do so. Due to the
limited resource of a node, relaying packets is not always in the node’s best interest, but
it’s in the best interest of the overall health of the network. Since we have a system
without a fixed infrastructure, communication between two distant nodes or an access
point becomes a challenge. Nodes can be geographically isolated from other nodes, and in
order to remain in communication with others, a negotiation with intermediary nodes is
necessary to have their packets relayed. The packet-forwarding dilemma of selfish nodes
is an issue. Incentives and rewards are motivations for greedy nodes to use their energy to
relay data of other nodes.
4.2.2

Motivations

Mobile devices in MANETs are selfish due to the limited resources available to them.
Due to the greediness of these nodes, it might be difficult for distant nodes to
communicate. In order for a source node to communicate with a distant destination node,
the source needs to run the routing algorithm and find the shortest path (multi-hop
network). It must then negotiate incentives and rewards with nodes along the path to
forward packets. Providing arbitrators as data carriers (mules) [52] and mobile devices
with wider transmission is beneficial in a multi-hop network because they can reduce the
number of hops as a result of their extended radio ranges. An arbitrator’s mobility can also
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provide the latest location that a node previously encountered in its pathway through a
routing table. Therefore, when an arbitrator offers to be the data carrier for a source node,
there is a better chance of having fewer hops to reach the destination.
The arbitrator’s role in the MANET introduces some implementation constraints which
needs to be considered. First, multiple nodes can solicit the same arbitrator at the same
time. To avoid collision packets due to the hidden node problem on the arbitrator’s
channel [53], the mobile nodes do not have to transmit at the same time. The hidden
terminal problem occurs when a node is in transmission range of a wireless access point
(AP), but not from the transmission range of other nodes communicating with the
determined AP. This leads to difficulties in media access control. To solve the problem,
the arbitrator implements a round robin algorithm [6] [53] coupled with the handshaking
procedure of the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA).
Apart from accommodating selfish nodes in the MANET, the arbitrator may also have to
deal with malicious nodes. These malicious nodes may collude with each other to drain an
arbitrator’s resource. Malicious nodes can extend the duration of the bargaining, which is
achieved by generating multiple bargain requests [54]. Meanwhile, normal nodes wait to
strike a bargain deal with the arbitrator before going out of radio range. Therefore, the
main objective of the malicious nodes is to waste energy resources of the arbitrator and
cause delays. The proposed solution to such collusion is for the arbitrator to limit the
number of bargaining requests and time spent with each node.
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4.2.3

Network Model

The MANET consists of wireless local area networks (WLANs) based on IEEE 802.11
standards and multiple access point (APs). Transmission devices mounted on vehicles
(light poles, bicycles, taxi cabs, cars, police cruisers, fire trucks, helicopters, etc.) are
considered mobile units. APs are deployed all over the WLAN as data repositories for all
collected data.
The movement of mobile devices is seen as random on a 3-dimensional plane. The
mobile node moves randomly and freely without restrictions, but the mobility coverage
area of two different types of vehicles may be different. For example, a city police cruiser
may cover city limits while a sheriff’s cruiser may cover both city and county limits. The
waypoints are random vectors uniformly distributed in the service area. A mobile node
keeps its neighbors informed by broadcasting any change that occurs, such as changes in
speed, direction, location, etc. During each time interval, the speeds are independently and
identically distributed (IID). When a mobile device arrives at a waypoint, it can stop or
change its parameters. We also present the method and constraint used to recognize the
arbitrator among the neighbors for the negotiation game. Nodes in need of data forwarding
services broadcast their request to all of their neighbors. The eventual arbitrator broadcasts
its availability to collect data from neighboring nodes. The arbitrator in the vicinity replies
to the group request only if it has the energy power and resource available to deliver data
to the destination.
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4.3 PROPOSED GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide an analysis of strategic interactions with the arbitrator and the
general equilibrium property of the negotiation game that uses simple majority rule with
finite horizon of negotiations. A node may be a radar unit, a wireless application, or sensor
involved in any monitoring activity or data supplying activity. We may have multiple
nodes to monitor the same environment or event. Given the limited mobility and
selfishness of nodes, a single node cannot sense and deliver data on its own [49]. Rather, a
node with high mobility is used as a mule (the arbitrator) for data transfer. An arbitrator in
an area collects data to be transferred to the AP and also governs the resource to be
allocated to each node. The shared resource is randomly assigned. Nodes receive their
offers and decide to either accept or reject them. A simple majority vote carries out the
ultimate decision. It is necessary to calculate the number p of negotiators yielding to their
offers, such that p ≥ int(n/2)+1, where n is the number of negotiators, and int represents
the integer division function. If the condition holds true, the majority of offers is accepted.
Otherwise, it is rejected, the players proceed to the next round, and the resource is
discounted by δ<1.
4.3.1

Negotiation Model

The players are the nodes. The set of players is N = {1,2,…, n}. An arbitrator is
introduced as an independent participant that owns the data-carrier unit to be shared
among players. The arbitrator submits offers to players and computes the decision. Players
provide location coordinates, speed, and direction of their movement. Let’s assume that
the arbitrator represents a random generator. Consider k, a given time interval that
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negotiations run on. At each shot, the arbitrator makes random offers. Also consider K the
number of interval cycles before the game is over due to node(s) being out of range. If
negotiations result in no decision between players, the game ends.
Based on the current location each player yields, the arbitrator estimates the residual
travel time before the group is dismantled. In order not to lose the negotiation session
completely, the arbitrator offers an equal allocation on the last time interval. Each player
can estimate its residual travel time with the arbitrator. The arbitrator applies the random
generator described in the following subsection.
4.3.2

Dirichlet Distribution

The Dirichlet distribution by definition, captures a sequence of observations of the n
possible outcomes with n positive real parameters x i , i=1,…,n, each corresponding to one
of the possible outcomes. The probability density function (pmf) of the Dirichlet
distribution (Dir) for variable vector x i = (x 1 , x 2 ,…, x n ) with parameter vector (k 1 , …, k n )
is given as
Dir ( x; k ) =

n
n
1
xiki −1 , xi ≥ 0, ∑ xi = 1, ki ≥ 1.
∏
B (k ) i =1
i =1

(4.1)

The constant, B(k), in the formula
B ( k ) = B ( k1 ,..., k n ) =

∏

n

i =1

Γ(ki )

Γ( k1 + ... + k n )

,

(4.2)

depends on a set of parameters (k 1 , …, k n ). They serve for adjusting the weights of the
distribution and if k is not a constant vector, the density is not symmetric [31]. The
operation Γ represents the Gamma function.
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4.3.3

Negotiation Game with Three Players

For simplicity, we start by presenting a three player negotiation game with an arbitrator.
The n players’ case study will be the subject of section V. In this section, we assume that
at least two players agree on their offers, the game ends. We also assume that the arbitrator
is the data-carrier. The arbitrator possesses a data storage unit available for packet
forwarding. For example, a 500 Megabytes of memory space available will be shared
among players if they agree on the offers. A share is presented as a fraction of a unit.
Let us examine the case of three players, and consider that the negotiations cover the
horizon of K shots. Thereafter, the game ends by count down if after K shots, there is no
agreement and any one player is out of transmission range. Let us suppose that k shots
remain. The arbitrator makes offers to players in a form vector (x 1 k, x 2 k, x 3 k). During each
cycle, offers represent random variables distributed according to the Dirichlet law. The
joint density function has the form,
f ( x1 , x2 , x3 ) =

Γ( k1 + k 2 + k3 ) k1 −1 k2 −1 k3 −1
x1 x2 x3
Γ( k1 )Γ( k 2 )Γ( k3 )

(4.3)

where x 1 +x 2 +x 3 = 1 and k 1 =k 2 =k 3 = 1, so that all players have the same weight.
For any given offer vector (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), each of the three players has two alternatives:
(i)

accepts the current offer or

(ii)

rejects the current offer with the hope of a better offer at the next period.

The delay caused by the non-agreement during each shot is discounted by δ (where δ ≤
1). The lost in energy for each player in terms of communication while rejecting an offer
should be worth the wait. At the last shot k = 0 with all previous negotiations failed, all
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three players always receive the ultimate offers. The ultimate offer is the vector (⅓, ⅓, ⅓)
in terms of storage allocation. Since the arbitrator follows majority rule, we must analyze
the scenario of two out of three players’ agreements to offers from the arbitrator.
4.3.4

Optimal Strategies for Majority Rule

An offer from the arbitrator is accepted if at least two of the three players consent. The
horizon of negotiations is finite with K shots before players are out of radio transmission.
Therefore, counting down to shot k, random offers from vector (x 1 k, x 2 k, x 3 k) are generated
using the Dirichlet distribution. Let U k denote the value of the negotiation game when k
shots remain until the end. Let’s consider (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) the offers for player 1, player 2 and
player 3, respectively. Let’s introduce the vector o(x i ), i = 1, 2, 3, where o defines the
probability that player i accepts the current offer x i . Set ō(x) = 1 - o(x). Let’s look for an
equilibrium among identical strategies.
Theorem 4.1: The optimal strategies of the players in the negotiation at period k possess
the form
ο i ( xi ) = Ι{ x ≥δU
i

k −1 }

, i = 1,2,3.

The utility value of this negotiation game for player P 1 meets the formula:
Uk =

1
− 2δ 2U k2−1 + 6δ 3U k3−1
3

(4.4)

Proof: The player P 1 utility payoff at period k is given by the formula:

From (4.5), we have
And

1

1−𝑥𝑥1

𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = sup 2 � 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 �
𝜇𝜇1

0

0

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑2 {(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 }, 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, …

𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇1 𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇3 + 𝜇𝜇̅1 𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇3 + 𝜇𝜇1 𝜇𝜇̅ 2 𝜇𝜇3 + 𝜇𝜇̅3 𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇1

𝐵𝐵 = 𝜇𝜇̅1 𝜇𝜇̅ 2 𝜇𝜇̅ 3 + 𝜇𝜇1 𝜇𝜇̅ 2 𝜇𝜇̅ 3 + 𝜇𝜇̅1 𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇̅ 3 + 𝜇𝜇̅1 𝜇𝜇̅ 2 𝜇𝜇3
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(4.5)

Where U 0 = b; μ 1 = μ 1 (x 1 ); μ 2 = μ 2 (x 2 ); μ 3 = μ 3 (1-x 1 -x 2 );
1

1

1−𝑥𝑥1

𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = sup 2 ∫0 𝜇𝜇1 (𝑥𝑥1 )𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘 (𝑥𝑥1 ) + 2 ∫0 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 ∫0
𝜇𝜇1

1−𝑥𝑥1

Where 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘 (𝑥𝑥1 ) = ∫0

𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘 (𝑥𝑥1 )𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2

(4.6)

{(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 )(𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜇𝜇2 − 𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇3 )}𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑2

And 𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘 = (𝑥𝑥1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 )𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇3 + 𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1

The optimal strategy for P 1 is 𝜇𝜇1 (𝑥𝑥1 ) = 𝐼𝐼{𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥1)≥0}

Due to problem’s symmetry, the optimal strategy for P 2 and P 3 is idem μ 2 = μ 3 . With

G k (0) ≤ 0 and G k (1) ≥ 0 there exist a such that G k (a) = 0. For and equilibrium among
threshold strategies, G k (x 1 ) has a different shape on the intervals:
G k (x 1 )=(x 1 -δU k-1 )(2 aI {x 1 ≤1-2a } +
2(1-a-x 1 )I{1-2a < x 1 ≤ 1-a} +

(4.7)

0I{1-a < x 1 <1})
With G k (a) = 0 and a = δU k-1 , we can express
G k (x 1 )= (x 1 -δU k-1 )(2 δU k-1 I {x 1 ≤ 1-2a }
+ 2(1- δU k-1 -x 1 )I{1-2 δU k-1 < x 1 ≤ 1- δU k-1 }

(4.8)

+ 0I{1- δU k-1 < x 1 <1})
If P 2 and P 3 choose the threshold strategies 𝜇𝜇2 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑥𝑥2≥𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 } and 𝜇𝜇3 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑥𝑥3 ≥𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 } then

the best response for P 1 must also be 𝜇𝜇1 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑥𝑥1 ≥𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 } and by substitution
1

1

+2� �
0

1−𝑥𝑥1

0

𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 2 � 𝜇𝜇1 (𝑥𝑥1 )𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘 (𝑥𝑥1 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1

{(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 )𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇3 + 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 }𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑2
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0

(4.9)

= 4𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1

1−2𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1

�

𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1

+4
+2

(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1
1−𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1

�

1−2𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1
1−2𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1

�
0

(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1 )(1 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1 − 𝑥𝑥1 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1

(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1 )(1 − 2𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1 − 𝑥𝑥1 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1

The recurrent formula brings to the result and proof that:
1

2
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1 + (1 − 3𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1 )(1 − 6𝛿𝛿 2 𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
) ends of the proof ■
3

In the case of no discounting, δ = 1, and the horizon of negotiations is infinite, we have

lim k→∞ U k = ⅓. Players should always take the offers when the arbitrator suggests.
4.3.5

Equilibrium Analysis

The strategy profile in period t is represented as {(x i t, x -i t), g -i t } where (x i t, x -i t) is the
splitting rule as offered by the arbitrator and g -i t is the function with arguments as players
except P i “accept”, then we have a majority which is ruled and each player gets its share
[13]. Otherwise, all players get nothing or “reject”. In the last period T-1, the strategy
profile {(x i T-1, x -i T-1), g -i T-1 } is a NE if g j T-1 (|x j T-1|) = “accept” for j ≠ i and there is no
value |x j T-1| > |z j T-1| such that g j T-1(|z j T-1|) = “accept” for j ≠ i that leads to the existence of a
value |x j T-1| < |z j T-1|.
Per NE, there is no incentive for P i to unilaterally increase its demand because any
increase request would cause a rejection by another P j ϵ P -i which will cause the game not
to reach the simple majority. As part of the number of players forming the simple majority
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rule, no players would want to reject a share offered by the arbitrator, since any rejection
of a share by the players will cause the game not to reach its simple majority quorum.
Finite Horizon Bargaining game: The finite horizon bargaining is the applicable game
for the MANET with arbitration for the reason that all players are dynamics, the mobility
of the players makes the bargaining finite because players will run out of transmission
range and furthermore cause possibly the end of the game. The finite horizon bargaining is
easily solved by backward induction.
Let’s consider n players, i =1, 2, 3,… the set of offers X=[ x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ], let u i (x) the utility
player i derives at period t. We assume u i (.) is continuous, we normalize to 0 the payoff
to players when there is no agreement. Let X 0 denote the set of offers from the arbitrator
that are individually rational for all players. X 0 = {x ϵ X, u i (x) > 0 for all i}, X 0 is nonempty and the payoff is assumed to be discounted by a common factor δ as δt-1u i (x). The
restriction is made to the stationary equilibrium where each player adopts the same
acceptance rule in each period. Given any stationary acceptance rule σ -i tracked by other
players, the largest expected payoff 𝑣𝑣̅𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎−𝑖𝑖 ) that player i may derive given σ -i . An optimal

acceptance rule for player i is thus to accept the proposal x if and only if u i (x) ≥ δ𝑣𝑣̅𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎−𝑖𝑖 )

which is stationary. Denotes A = {x ϵ X, ∃N 0 ⊂ {1,2,3}, |N 0 |= n 0 , u i (x) ≥ δv i ∀i ϵ N0},
and the equilibrium satisfies v i = P E[u i (x) | x ϵ A] + (1 − P)δv i where P = Pr(x ϵ A)
Proposition 4.1: Whatever is the majority requirement (n 0 ), a stationary equilibrium
exists. [13]
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Proof: Define the function v → φ(v), where φ i (v) corresponds to the right hand side
(RHS) of v i and let ū = max i,x u i (x). The function φ is continuous from [0, ū]n to itself,
thus, it has a fixed point.
4.3.6

Communication Overhead Analysis

The analysis of communication overhead in MANETs is an issue because it affects the
energy consumption of an already limited battery lifetime of the mobile node. The
communication overhead is related to different parameters such as the network size,
node’s mobility, node radio range, and network density [54]. The nodes requesting the
arbitrator’s service are considered a spontaneous cluster with the arbitrator as the cluster
head (CH) for the bargaining process. The CH knows the identities of the nodes in need
of service based on their primary request message. The reply message from the CH is to
inform about the availability of an arbitrator. Nodes are in 1-hop distance from the CH
[54] [51]. The negotiation between mobile nodes and the arbitrator follows an efficient
cluster-based exchange of messages and data. The spontaneous cluster is dismantled once
the bargaining is completed or one of the mobile nodes is out transmission range.
4.4 NEGOTIATION WITH N PLAYERS
In this section, we show how to deal with the game engaging n players. The arbitrator
evaluates the majority m = int(n/2)+1, such that the majority is reached if at least m
players accept their offers during negotiations. The arbitrator randomly generates offers in
the form of vector (x 1 k, x 2 k,…, x n k) at shot k. The joint density function of the Dirichlet
distribution is described by:
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f ( x1 ,..., xn ) = ( n − 1)!,

(4.10)

∑i xi = 1, xi > 0

Let U k indicates the value of the game at shot k and K denote the number of negotiation
cycles before the game ends. In a negotiation game with majority rule, the arbitrator needs
to have the consent of the majority players (m players) in order to transfer the data
collected to the AP. With n players on the line, the arbitrator aims for a complete consent
from players. The arbitrator then counts the number of players that agree on their offers.
The game ends when the counting is greater or equal to m. For the vector (x 1 k, x 2 k,…, x n k)
generated at shot k, the optimality equation is defined by:
1

U kn = ( n − 1)!

∫G

n
k

(4.11)

( x1 ) dx1 + δU kn−1

δU kn−1

According to [4], the function G k n(x) is in the form
Gkn ( x1 ) = ( x1 − δU kn−1 )

1− x1 −...− xn − 2

1− x1

∫

...

δU kn−1

 ( x1 − δU

=



n
k −1

∫ dx ...dx
2

n −1

δU kn−1

(4.12)

)(1 − x1 − ( n − 1)δU )
, x1 ≤ 1 − (n − 1)δU kn−1
(n − 2)!
0, x1 > 1 − (n − 1)δU kn−1
n
n−2
k −1

By substitution into (4.10), (4.11) and also apply certain simplifications we have:
U kn = δU kn−1 +

(1 − nδU kn−1 ) n
n

(4.13)

Theorem 4.2: Consider the resource sharing problem with n players and the agreement
by the players of their shared resources. The optimal strategies of players at shot k are
determined by: [4]
ο i ( xi ) = Ι{ x ≥δU
i
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k −1 }

, i = 1,..., n.

The utility value of this negotiation game for a player meets the recurrent formula
defined as follows:
U kn = δU kn−1 +

(1 − nδU kn−1 ) n
n

(4.14)

Proof: Consider the resource sharing problem with n players, the offer’s acceptance
requires complete consent: p = n
The joint density function to the Dirichlet distribution is as follows: f(x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x n )=(n-1)!,
Denote Un k the utility value of players of the game at shot k,
μ0 = 1-μ and μ1 = μ, also the annotation μσ where σ = {0, 1}
1

𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛 = (𝑛𝑛 − 1)! sup �� �
𝜇𝜇1

Where 𝜗𝜗 represents
𝜗𝜗 =

�

(𝜎𝜎1 𝜎𝜎2 …𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 )

𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛

+� � …
0

0

0

𝜇𝜇1

�

�
0

0

𝜗𝜗�

𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑝𝑝
��
𝑛𝑛
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1
, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 < 𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑2 … 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛−1

1

0

1−𝑥𝑥1

0

1−𝑥𝑥1 − ⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2

…�

0

𝜇𝜇1 .

𝜎𝜎

{𝜇𝜇2 2 … 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 . 𝐹𝐹1,𝑘𝑘 }𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 … 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛−1

(𝜎𝜎2 𝜎𝜎3 …𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 )

1−𝑥𝑥1 − ⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2

𝜎𝜎

1−𝑥𝑥1 − ⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2

…�

𝜎𝜎
… 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 . �

= (𝑛𝑛 − 1)! sup{� �
.

1 1−𝑥𝑥1

𝜎𝜎 𝜎𝜎
�𝜇𝜇1 1 𝜇𝜇22

0

1−𝑥𝑥1

𝜇𝜇

𝜇𝜇

(1 − 𝜇𝜇1 ). � {𝜎𝜎2 2 … 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛 . 𝐹𝐹2,𝑘𝑘 }𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 … 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛−1 }
𝜎𝜎2 …𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛

The optimal strategy is defined by:
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𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛

1

= (𝑛𝑛 − 1)! �

𝑛𝑛
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1

𝑛𝑛
𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥1 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1

(4.15)

𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥1 )

𝑝𝑝−1

= 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛−1 (𝑥𝑥1

1−𝑥𝑥1

𝑛𝑛 )
− 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
� …

1−𝑥𝑥1 − ⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2

0

< 𝑎𝑎}}𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑2 … 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛−1

�
0

𝑝𝑝

𝐼𝐼{�

𝑖𝑖=2

𝑛𝑛

{𝑥𝑥1 ≥ 𝑎𝑎} �

{𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖=𝑝𝑝+1

Where the function Gn k-1 (x 1 ) is defined as:
𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥1 )

= (𝑥𝑥1 −

(4.16)

1−𝑥𝑥1
1−𝑥𝑥1 − ⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2
𝑛𝑛
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘−1 ) �
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By replacing the expression into (4.18), we have:

This concludes the proof. ■
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)𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛

Require: # players, N≥3; Time period before out of range, T; storage,
Q; time transferring a packet, t; Cost factor, δ;
Initialization: ;
1:

c ← minvalue of player payload

2:

While T > 0 do
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3:

Arbitrator makes offers to players

4:

For each Player receiving offer do

5:

If accept (Player i ) then increment count End If

6:

If count reach Majority Then Data-Transfer

7:

Else No Data-Transfer
Q ← Q(1 – δ) ;

8:
9:

End If

10:

Decrement T;

11:

End While

12:

End
Table 4.2: Algorithm for arbitration

The complete consent of the players is the target of the arbitrator when offers are made.
Players have the same weight when the time comes to transfer data. The randomly
generated offers made by the arbitrator are the size of the resources to transfer to
destination. In case, players participating in the game have the same weights, the
distribution guarantees the same opportunities for all players. However, if a player has a
higher weight, its parameter will be increase during the Dirichlet distribution. Moreover,
the final solution of utility depends on the length of the negotiations horizon. The
algorithm in table 1 shows how resources are allocated among the players.

67

4.5 SIMULATION RESULTS

S1

D1

A1

Figure 4.1: Snapshot of MANET, source S 1 , destination D 1 and arbitrator A 1 with
different routes to destination
In this section, we provide MATLAB simulations for better insight into analysis of the
negotiations with or without arbitrators. The arbitrators use Dirichlet’s distribution to
make offers to players. This research work has proposed a high-level, game theoretic
modeling for decisions of data transfer in MANET based on a simple majority
mechanism. In the simulation, we quantitatively compare our proposed mechanism with
the Service Negotiation model for Selfish nodes in the MANETs (SNSM) [53].
Parameter values

Parameter
Simulation Time

500 sec

rotocol

AODV

Number of Nodes

20, 30, 40

Arbitrator Nodes

5, 10

Transmission Range

20m, 35m

Node Initial Position

Randomly distributed

Mobility Model

Random Waypoint

Simulation Area

100m x 100m

Channel Type

Wireless Channel
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Node Speed interval

0.2 m/sec – 15m/sec

Traffic Type

Constant Bite Rate

Time Step

0.1 sec

Table 4.2: Simulation Environment

The SNSM is also compared with the mechanisms of TIT-FOR-TAT (TFT) and TimeDependent of Bourware tactics (TBD) [45] [53]. The SNSM designs a negotiation model
for service bidding of selfish nodes in MANET. The use of virtual currency enables selfish
nodes to participate in the network lifetime achievement.
The simulation setup parameters are provided in Table 4.2. We considered a MANET
with 20 to 40 mobile nodes, including arbitrators randomly distributed initially in an area
of 100m x 100m. Each node is free to move with a speed range of 0.2-15m/s, and also a
20m radio range. Arbitrators have a 35m radio range. The heterogeneity of the mobile
nodes in the network creates an asymmetric communication between a normal node and
an arbitrator. Regular nodes can only communicate with an arbitrator if they agree on the
offers from the arbitrator. Meanwhile, an arbitrator can directly communicate with any
regular node provided that, a deal is made to find the shortest route to destination.

Figure 4.2. MATLAB Simulation Screen of 20 Mobile Nodes (15 normal Nodes and 5
Arbitrators)
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Figure 4.3: (a) Complete Consent

(b) Simple Majority

Figure 4.3 represents the advantage of using arbitrators for data transfer in a network
with selfish nodes. We have a 75% connectivity failure due to mobility and selfish nodes
ignoring communication requests. When injecting the network with 5 arbitrators, we have
almost a 15% decrease in connectivity failure. By increasing the number of arbitrators to
10 in a 20 node network, the connectivity failure ratio drops by 35%. It’s noticeable in the
network that the arbitrators with wider radio ranges reduce the number of hops to the
destination.
The offers made by the arbitrator result in acceptance or rejection by the players. Data
transfer only happens if a majority of players consent. The average utility is defined as
such in [53]. In our proposed scheme, the mean is half the offers made to player i and its
minimum acceptable payload. The arbitrator’s resources available to players are
empirically shared between the subset of players for the duration of the negotiation.
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Normalizing the shareable resource to “1” unit gives 1/n, the shared value allotted to each
of the n players. Most successful negotiation sequences occur when the minimum required
load per player is lower than 1/n.

0.12
0.1
0.08

Average Utility

0.06
0.04
0.02
0
-0.02

SNSM
Arbitrator

-0.04
5

10

15
Bargaining Sequence

20

25

30

Figure 4.4: Average Utility Obtained during Negotiation Sequence for both SNSM and
Arbitration
Figure 4.4 shows the average degree of utility for the SNSM with a maximum value of
0.1. Unsuccessful rounds of bargaining are represented by the value 1. The proposed
solution with the arbitrators making offers to mobile nodes has a very low average utility.
Mobile nodes also have low minimum payloads. The average utility between the offer and
the minimum acceptable payload by a mobile node is almost equal to zero. The proposed
solution has a better performance compared to the SNSM.
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Figure 4.5: Negotiation Game with Three Players (c)
The negotiation game implemented through simulation shows in figure 4 5 (a) that
player’s payoff when using the complete consent for different value of the discount factor
δ = {.95, .90, .85, 75} decreases. Around the period T = 6, it tends to stabilize and remain
constant. For the simple majority in figure 4.5 (b), the player’s payoff decreases and
stabilizes by the period T = 3. Of course, the majority player’s payoff is higher than the
complete consent because, only the simple majority of players’ needs to agree and for the
game to successfully end compared to an agreement of all the players.
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0.5
Complete Consent
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Figure 4.6: Average minimum Payoff a player received during negotiation
The figure 4.5 (c) shows the advantage of a simple majority in terms of player’s payoff
compared to complete consent. The network is also beneficial with the fact there is an
agreement for the arbitrator to carry the task of data transfer over. A better player’s payoff
for the complete consent will be to reach an agreement by the third period (T = 3). The
figure 4.6 shows an estimate of the average minimum player’s utility based on the number
of nodes composing the spontaneous cluster. A cluster of two nodes will have almost the
same minimum payoff for each node.
4.6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter models the problem of dynamic resource allocation in a multi-hop MANET
of N heterogeneous nodes (including arbitrators) as a perfect information bargaining game
where arbitrators make offers using Dirichlet’s distribution. The proposed algorithm based
on simple majority works to the advantage of the overall network through involvement of
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arbitrators in data transfer. The arbitrator’s offers of 1/n to all requests enable the players
to accept based on there being no frustrations with other nodes receiving preferential
treatment. We have performed through simulation, which clearly showed that, if the
arbitrators are rational, they can dynamically adapt their decisions to achieve the best
benefit and optimize the network performance. The case of malicious arbitrators or
malicious nodes and malicious arbitrators colluding will be the subject of future
investigation.
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CHAPTER 5
GAME THEORETIC MODELING OF SECURITY AND TRUST RELATIONSHIP IN
CYBERSPACE
Today, online network services have evolved as the highest-emergent medium,
enabling various online activities to be lucrative. However, these lucrative activities also
bring new forms of privacy threats to the community. In a reliable e-business service,
users should be able to trust the providers of the service to protect their customers’
privacy. The service providers should not risk the personal and private information about
their customers in cyberspace. There is an economic gain for a business provider when
users trust the service provider. Despite those benefits, cyber security concern is the main
reason some large organization may go bankrupted. Unfortunately, attackers may attempt
to breach a provider’s database and expose customers’ private information. Therefore, in
this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework for security and trust relationship in
cyberspace for users, service providers and attackers. Mathematical proofs and
evaluations support our model. Service providers may use the model to see how
important and dissuasive against attackers is when investing in cybersecurity.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In an ever-growing telecommunication industry, E-business gradually becomes of an
importance to the social economy. While Online Social Network (OSN) has quickly
grown into a wide network, for convenience, users see these OSNs not just as a platform
to establish contacts, but also as a source of business, advertisement and entertainment.
Although OSN users receive a variety of advantages and benefits from these services, the
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OSN providers are seeking financial gain. The applications developed for these OSNs
generate enormous interest in how people use cyberspace like Internets, Facebook,
Instagram, and Twitter. This win-win solution also comes with new threats and privacy
concerns to the community [58]. Considering the exponential increase of requests in
cyberspace on a daily basis, this is a critical challenge for users and providers. For
instance, malicious websites and fake URL addresses that look like the real deal. The
attack is led to make the user believe he is on the right website and trick him to provide
personal information. This deception can come through web-forms in an email received
from an acquaintance containing a link to click; but in fact the link is embedded with a
malware to collect private information from the user and his computer interactions [39].
5.1.1

Motivation

OSN providers should strive to protect their users’ privacy and information. User
privacy and private information in the wrong hands will definitely hurt the monetary
benefits of the provider. Risk and trust are two behavioral factors that sway decision
making in an uncertain environment like cyberspace. While OSN providers face cyber
attack on a daily basis, it is their responsibility to educate the users about all potential
breaches of security and the methods to mitigate the risk [40].
Mass media are on the front line of creating awareness information that leads people to
develop a bias and trust cyberspace differently. Whenever there is a security breach the
media may induce emotional outbursts about risks and their potential consequences; for
example, the identity theft of Target Store credit card users and the massive hack of Home
Depot customers’ information. [58]. We proposed in this chapter a game theoretic
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approach to establishing a relationship between trust, defined as a kind of risk assessment
and various factors that could affect the assessments (risk). The media can tilt the balance
of information in most trust systems that considers risk as a psychological cost. Moreover,
breach of security on a providers’ infrastructure by attackers will have less impact if users
are informed by the providers than a television broadcast or newspaper. Therefore,
distrusting a providers’ capability to secure users’ privacy and private information will
hamper any plausible positive results. It is consistent with intuition: a user who hears a
security breach of private information on the news foresees a lack of investment in
security infrastructure and intent to cover up compared to providers reaching out to users
and inform them of the security breach and a promise to upgrade security infrastructure.
5.1.2

Contribution

This chapter centers around the proposed concept to mitigate cyber attack behavior
with security implementation. The preponderance of successful attack launch by an
attacker or a group of attackers may be because of the vulnerability of the security
infrastructure due to a lack of adequate investment. System administrators defend the
system ‘s infrastructure against intelligent misbehaving users (attackers), while users
tempt not to trust an online service in case of a compromised of their data privacy. The
specific contributions in this work are summarized below:
•

We propose a mechanism design to mitigate cyber attack behavior in security
implementation using a game-theoretic approach.

•

We formulate an original three-player game to model conflicting and rational
confrontation between players.
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•

We analyze the different solutions obtained from the Nash equilibrium (NE)

•

We interpret the different outcomes on how they may benefits system administrator
or decision-maker.

The provider’s objective is to secure the users private data against an attacker whose
objective is to breach the system and expose users’ private information. The user’s main
concern is to safely use his private information in cyberspace.
Some research work exist in this area which we summarize here. In [39], Kim et al.
examined the relationship between trust and risk as determinants of trusting behavior in
e-commerce. The risk of cyberspace manners can be classified as high, low and
inexistent. Cyberspace behaviors include activities such as online purchase of an article
or providing private information to an e-vendor.
Kamhoua et al. [61] proposed a game theoretic model to help the online social network
users determine the optimal policy in terms of data sharing using a zero-sum Markov
game model. While the authors make the assumption that the probability transition
function, the reward and the discount factor are common knowledge among players.
There is a possibility that some of the information is made private or not available to the
opponent. Huber et al. [35], presented the Friends-in-the-middle Attacks by exploiting
social networking sites for spam. The impact of spam is simulated on the online social
site Facebook. Raya et al. [36] proposed and analyzed a game theoretic model of the
trust-privacy tradeoff using incentives that allow building trust and at the same time
keeping the privacy loss at a minimum. The game model shows that individual players do
not contribute to trust establishment unless they received an appropriate incentive. As an

78

example, the process of revoking of access rights for misbehaving nodes is not done
unless there are incentives for voting players.
Seigneur et al. [37] introduced an approach to achieve the tradeoff between trust and
privacy in online transactions. The privacy is preserved with the use of pseudonyms for
different transactions. Thus, the linkability of the transactions is prevented and a level of
reputation is assigned to each of the pseudonyms. In order to increase the level of trust of
an entity, a combination of several reputation levels is required and the number of
pseudonyms to link depends on the reputation trust level. Lilien et al. [38] discuss the
difference between privacy preservation and trust establishment for online transactions.
Assumptions are made about users having a set of private attributes that they want to
conceal and a set of corresponding credentials that are helpful in establishing trust for
these users. The tradeoff problem is formulated as the choice of the minimum number of
credentials to be revealed for satisfying trust requirements, such that the users’ privacy
loss is minimized.
Douss et al. [60] discussed a game-base trust establishment for mobile ad hoc networks
(MANET). The authors introduce an evaluation model for trust value. Then, a
computational evaluation of the methods is applied and finally, a framework is proposed
for trust establishment. Han et al. [78] proposed a method of infiltration exploitable
through cloud and not the traditional computing process: the side channels. It gives a rise
to new risks as hardware to create a virtual machine (VM) is shared between users, which
attackers can exploit. By starting and having the VM in the same server as a user data, an
attacker can siphon private information such as web traffic and encryption keys. Given
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the danger of cross-side channel attacks, some user may require while using the cloud
service to be physically isolated from the resource of the cloud service provider. Zhang et
al. [79] proposed HomeAlone which is a defensive tool that helps a user determining if
its VM resource allocation has an exclusive use of the physical machine. The tool can
detect the activity of an attacker’s co-resident VM by analyzing a portion of the L2
memory cache set aside by his VMs.
Basar et al. [80] explained the devastating cost of failure to properly secure a network
from an attack. The authors showed how an attacker can infiltrate a network at one node,
and from the compromised node, the attacker can breach easily and access other nodes of
the network infrastructure. Wang et al. [81] analyzed the nodes’ decision in a cluster
environment. The cluster environment is composed of n clusters of m nodes, which is n x
m individual nodes. The attacker to launch an attack chooses the number of clusters to
attack, while the defender chooses how many nodes can participate in the decision in
each cluster. A zero-sum game is formulated during which the defender maximizes the
expected number of clusters that decide correctly and in the same time the attacker
minimizes the say number. A general framework is proposed to find the Nash
equilibrium. However, the assumption made is that the structure of the cluster is fixed,
which give a better optimization strategy to the defender by just changing the cluster
structure.
In short, the previous researches on privacy are mostly focused on the current interests
of the different players, and previous works on defense against an attacker or an intruder
are mostly concentrated in the interests of both players. But most of the game players
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would like to take the long-term strategy in face of interest for all three players in the
game. In the existing literature, when using game theory frameworks, there is no threeplayer game. We have a two-player game: the defender against the attacker or the
provider strategizing on how to improve trust with the users. None of the game
approaches involve the defender, the user and the attacker at the same time. In this
chapter, even though, the media viewpoints create awareness that influences users to be
more bias in trust of various OSNs differently. We are interested in the relationship
established between trust and risk in cyberspace using game theoretic modeling.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The section 5.2 presents the
system and the threat models. In Section 5.3, we propose the game theoretic model.
Section 5.4 presents the numerical results. Finally, the conclusion and future works are
drawn in Section 5.5.
5.2 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
5.2.1

Objectives

With the development and popularization of online network service (ONS), the safety
of ONS’s users’ privacy becomes a crucial and critical issue. The service provided gains
in popularity because it facilitates the living conditions of the people. Any proven
amelioration of living conditions will always attract more and more customers or users.
To better serve its customer, a service provider has to deploy and make the service
available anywhere and at anytime it is needed. As any lucrative business, the service
provider in order to remain in business has to secure and protect its own confidential data
and for the incentive of doing the business, secure and protect customers confidential and
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data privacy. Whenever there are financial and private information flowing around, there
will always be misbehaving actors trying to take advantage of the situation.
5.2.2

System Model

The figure 5.1 illustrates our system model: An online service provider with lots of
customers that use the services through their electronic devices with connections to the
Internet. The users are known as regular customers with their electronic apparel (i.e.
Computer, laptop, tablet, smartphone, etc.) using cyberspace (i.e. Web-apps, mobileapps, phone-apps) to buy goods or services. Technically, the user may run different
number and version of applications provided by the business service without any negative
impact on this illustrated model. The applications, even though use on different devices
to access the online services require an operating system to function and the operating
system is managed by a service provider. In practice, a user in order to acquire goods or
services online has to provide personal information, but not limited to: full name, address,
DOB, social security #, credit card #, PIN#, bank account#, etc... These information in
the wrong hands may cause lots of damages to the owner of the information. The
damages can range from financial ruins, bankruptcy, loss of identity, debts, and more.
The attacker or group of attackers represented on figure 1 illustration as “Attacker” is an
intelligent user with unorthodox behavior. The attacker's main intention is to launch an
attack or even coordinated attacks to gain access to critical or confidential information of
the service provider and users’ private information. Instead of the attacker launching
attack against “easy” target like a user because of the minimal security an user can afford,
the attacker prefers to launch attack against the service provider. In case of a successful
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attack, the payoff will be colossal. Therefore, there are three major players defined in our
system model, the users, the providers, and the attackers. The users are known as regular
customers with their electronic apparel using cyberspace (i.e. online applications) to buy
goods or services. The providers are businesses developed on the cyberspace that provide
goods and services that are financially profitable. The attackers are entities with
malicious intent. Their agenda is to attack providers’ infrastructures and collect users’
privacy, private information and companies’ secrets. The attackers possess the electronic
gears to launch an attack on the provider’s infrastructure. A direct attack on one user is
not that beneficial for the attacker. Therefore, an attack on the data repository of a
provider may lead to a gain in multiple users’ private information.

Provider Infrastructure System

User

Firewall

Firewall

Data Center

Servers

Database

Servers

Database

Attacker

Figure 5.1: Overview of Component Interactions between User/Attacker/Provider
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We assume a user needs his personal and private data available in order to conduct an ebusiness. We also assume that there are risks involved when information is used online.
Users are aware of the potential risks; therefore the user needs to have a level of trust and
confidence before providing personal information. The user takes all necessary
precaution to keep his private information hidden from the public. The service providers
need to invest in security for two major reasons:
1. To protect their infrastructure against daily attack perpetrates by attackers.
2. To secure transaction information made by the users.
For example, any interactions with the user that involve exchange of users’ private data
over the internet should be secured using secure sockets layer (SSL). The implementation
of credential verification will make sure that the user using the information is the user
owning the information. We assume the attacker’s main objective is to breach the
providers’ infrastructure security system and gets the users’ and company’s private
information. Going after a user’s private data directly may not be beneficial to an
attacker. Moreover, the user’s data like credit card information can be cancelled and
rendered useless to the attacker. The attacker monitors the providers’ system for security
vulnerabilities. For example, an operating system may have bugs exploitable to gain
administrator credentials to the system, or strong passwords were not implemented and
are easily guessed or tricked.
The goal is to make it difficult for attackers to breach the system and gain access to
useful business and users’ private information. Providers’ data that can be breached are
divided in two groups: futile and vital. Providers’ strategies to be safe include investing
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in system upgrades, vulnerability correctness, architectural scalability of data, and
network security. If a security breach occurs, this would limit the breach to futile data as
much as possible, while making the system available and user friendly. Users have the
tendency to either trust or are suspicious of online-sites because of the available
information at risk.
In our model, we do not address the leakage of business and users’ private information
by mechanisms other than the attacker breaching the provider’s security system. For
example, a business may sell users’ information to another company for financial profit.
Although this constitutes a user privacy breach, it is outside the scope of our research
work.
5.2.3

Trust-Risk Game Model

In spite of the risks reported about threats in cyberspace, for example, the spread of
malicious worms on computing systems, cybercrime such as identity theft that may lead to
financial ruin, money laundering by the drug cartel on the internet [39] [40], people still
show a high level of dependency on cyberspace. Given that private information is traded
for the user’s trust, privacy preserving entities (cyber system providers) have to participate
at a satisfactory level of trust without gratuitously revealing too much private information.
Users have the tendency to trust or distrust a cyber-site because of the risk perception on
sharing their private information. Hence, a user perception of low trust for a cyber-site
may be associated with his perception of a high risk and its consequences on his privacy
and private data. Similarly, the perception of high trust can be associated with the
perception of low risk which implies negligible consequences for privacy and private data
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shared. Therefore, trust and risk are reverse mechanism concepts which mostly
conceptually reflect how a user makes a choice to use cyberspace for business, social or
private transactions. It becomes paramount to find and implement a mechanism of fairness
protection between the user’s private data and the provider’s ability to secure. It is even
questionable whether both entities would be efficient in data protection.
The use of game theory is called to solve the above related issues. We have the AttackerDefender game (ADG) between the attacker and the provider and the User-Provider game
(UPG) between the user and the provider. ADG captures the competitive interactions
between the attacker who is trying to circumvent the provider’s system and gain access to
users’ private data and the provider who needs to invest in securing its customers/users’
private data. UPG models the combination of factors that helps the user assigning a level
of risk (high or low) on an e-business or OSN if their privacy and private information is
shared. Moreover, if data breaches occur, how efficient is the corrective approach to
mitigate the damages.
We combine both games ADG: non-cooperative game between 2 players; the provider
and the attacker, UPG: cooperative game between two players; the user and the provider
into one game theoretic with three players: user, provider, and attacker.
5.3 GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
This section considers a game with three players: An attacker, a provider and a user. Our
assumption is that the three players are rational. Therefore, they understand the system in
place and can perform the necessary calculation to only take the actions that improve their
expected payoff. The attacker has two defined strategies: launch an attack (A) on the
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provider’s infrastructure or Not launch an attack (NA). Only one of the two strategies can
be used at a time by an attacker. The attacker strategy to launch an attack on the provider’s
infrastructure may consist of a multi-stage process involving steps such as a brute force
attack, scanning for known vulnerabilities, SQL injection, buffer overflow, exploit attack,
bypass firewall rules with spoof attack, Trojan horse or backdoor attack. The provider of
the system has two choices in terms of strategies, to either Invest in security (IS) or Not to
Invest (NIS). The provider’s strategy to invest may consist of a multi-stage process and
actions such as system-wide monitoring, software updates, patching of vulnerabilities,
installing intrusion detection system (ids), clustering and duplicating data servers, and/or
IP-hopping and firewalling. Therefore, the financial component tends to influence the
provider to not invest in security. The user has also two strategies applicable: trust the
provider’s cyber-site (T) with their personal information henceforth, uses it to make a
transaction or distrust (D) the provider’s system and does not use it.
A 3-tuple represents a strategy profile for this game which indicates the action taken by
each player. For example, the strategy profile (T, IS, A) shows that the user trusts the
provider’s system to make a transaction, the provider invests in security for his
infrastructure, and the attacker launches an attack to breach the provider’s system.
Let us examine the utility structure of the game. Given the profile of action, the
payoff/utility is the player satisfaction. We normalize the payoffs to the players following
the strategy profile. Following are the parameters used in the game:
•

The parameter α represents the probability of an attacker getting detected or caught
on the provider’s system, given that he has invested in security.
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•

The parameter b represents the benefit of the attacker from attacking and not
getting detected or caught by the provider.

•

The parameter λ represents the loss to the provider if an attacker launches an attack
on the provider’s system and the attacker is not detected or caught.

•

The parameter p represents the loss to the attacker from getting detected while
launching an attack on the provider’s system.

•

The parameter σ represents the probability that critical data in the provider’s
system are compromised given a successful attack. We consider that any
successful attack on the provider’s system will give up critical data, which means σ
> 0. Moreover, not all successful attacks can compromise the provider’s critical
data (σ < 1). Therefore, we have 0 < σ <1.

The correctness of our game model depends on the correct estimation of the loss λ and
the probability α. The guidance issued [6] by the United States Securities Exchange
commission (SEC) requiring companies to disclose all cyber incidents with detail
description of costs and relevant information such as insurance coverage. Therefore, the
data provided from previous cyber incidents can be used to estimate the different
probabilities values and cost to be used with our defined game model. There is a sense of
assurance when a provider invests in security which has its reward.
•

The parameter R represents the reward that can be calculated as a function of
revenue generated by the users’ transactions because the users see the provider’s
system a low risk in terms of divulging their private information.
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•

The parameter e represents the total expenses. Investing in security by the provider
requires a total expense.

•

The parameter G represents the gain defined as what the user gains by using the
cyberspace for any transactions. For example, user shops online from the comfort
of your home or office compared to spending time, driving to the store, spending
money on gas, etc.

•

The parameter d represents the cost of a user that worried about his private
information being compromised or when the user is informed that there was a
security breach on one of its service providers and the steps taken to monitor and
mitigate the situation.

Table 5.1 shows the game model in normal form. Table 5.1 is a combination of two
tables. The left-table shows the game model when the user trust (T) the provider’s cyber
system. The right-table shows the game model when the user distrusts (D) the provider’s
cyber system. The payoffs of the three players are represented in each block in three lines.
The first line in the block is the user payoff. The second line is the provider payoff, and
the third line represents the attacker payoff.
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User trust (T)

User distrust (D)

Attacker

Attacker

A

Provider

IS

NIS

NA

A

NA

{G – λ + αλ;

{G;

{G – λ + αλ - d;

{G - d;

R – e – λ (1 – α);

R - e;

R – e – λ (1 – α);

R - e;

b - pα}

0}

b - pα}

0}

{G – λ + αλ;

{G;

{G – λ + αλ - d;

{G - d;

R - λ;

R;

R - λ;

R;

b}

0}

b}

0}

(a ) User plays action (T)

(b) User plays action (D)

Table 5.1: Stage Game in Normal Form

The payoffs are calculated as follows: If the player chooses the strategy profile (T, IS,
A), which means, the user trusts (play action T) the provider’s system and uses it for cyber
transactions, while the provider invests in security (play action IS) and the attacker
launches an attack (play action A) targeting users’ private information (cf. Left-table, 4th
line, 3rd column).
The provider gets a reward R for investing in security and also incurs a cost e for the
security expenses. Amid the attacker launches an attack with a probability α (because the
provider has invested), it will incur a loss λ(1 - α) if successful. This will result in an
expected loss of λ(1 - α) for the provider. The attacker payoff is the benefit b of launching
without getting caught or detected less the probability α of getting detected if the provider
invests in security:
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U att (T, IS, A) = b - pα
The user payoff
U user (T, IS, A) = G – λ + αλ
is the difference between the gain of the user’s trust in using the system and the expected
loss from the system if compromised. The user’s partial loss λ(1 - α) is the result of the
attacker breaches into the provider’s system and gains critical information which are
users’ private data. The player’s payoffs in the other strategies profile are calculated the
same way.
5.3.1

Game and Equilibrium Analysis

This section analyzes the game, derives all possible Nash equilibria from the game in
Table 1, and understands its impact on the players. Per definition of Nash equilibrium
profile: no player can increase his payoff by a unilateral deviation. Moreover, players are
rational; each of them is playing his best strategic response to other two players’ best
strategies. Thus, the Nash equilibrium can help predict the behavior of the player wanting
to maximize their payoff in the game.
R – e – λ(1 – α) > R – λ

e<λα

(5.1)

It means that investing in security is the best option for the provider in order to lower the
risk of users’ private information being breached. Moreover, the attacker can only target
the provider’s system knowing that the provider has invested in security when we have:
b – pα > 0
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(5.2)

The penalty is huge for the attacker to get detected while launching an attack on the
provider’s system. The reward of launching an attack should be worth the risk of getting
caught.
As a matter of fact, any game in strategic form has a Nash equilibrium (NE). Let find the
conditions applicable to the parameters for all possible pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5.1: If α < α 0 = e/λ, then the game in Table 1 admits a pure strategy NE profile
(T, NIS, A).
Proof: An examination of the eight different pure strategies in Table 1 shows that the
only possible pure NE is when the provider does not invest in security, the user trusts the
cyber system and the attacker launches an attack on the provider’s infrastructure. For the
other strategy profiles, there is at least one player able to increase its payoff by a unilateral
deviation.
When the attacker targets the system and the provider does not invest in security, we
have:
U att (T, IS, A)-U att (T, NIS, A)



R – e – λ(1 – α) = R – λ

(5.3)

λα – e = f(α).
The function f(α). is a linear function with slope λα and its lower bound value is the cost
e. Thus, f(α) is increasing.
The initial value f(α 0 ) = λα 0 – e = 0.
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Case 1: if e > λ α,
then U att (T, NIS, A)–U att (T, NIS, NA) > 0.
This condition is not the choice to fulfill to the best for the provider’s system by not
securing its infrastructure. The provider prefers not to invest than to invest. The attacker
prefers to attack with a positive payoff the provider’s system than not to attack. The
strategy profile (T, NIS, A) is a pure Nash equilibrium because the players of the game
cannot increase their payoff by a unilateral deviation.
Case 2: if e/λ < α < b/p,
then we have the difference in the payoff U att (T, IS, A) - U att (T, IS, NA) > 0.
Thus, the attacker prefers to launch an attack on the provider’s system than not to attack.
The payoff U prov (T, IS, A) – U prov (T, NIS, A) > 0.
Thus, the provider prefers to invest than not to invest into the security of his system. The
strategy profile (T, IS, A) is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game because neither the
provider nor the attacker can increase their payoff by a unilateral deviation.
Case 3: if e < λα and α > b/p
There are no pure strategy profiles for a Nash equilibrium in the game. The strategy
profile (T, IS, A) is not a NE because the attacker can increase his payoff by simply
changing his strategy from A to NA. The strategy profile (T, NIS, A) is not a NE because
the provider can increase his payoff by simply changing his strategy from NIS to IS. With
this back and forth reasoning, it conveys to us that we do not have a pure strategy NE.
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However, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is highly plausible, and it’s defined and set
as follows: denote the variables 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1.
Let θ = xT + (1 - x)D be the probability mixed strategy NE of the user. From the basic
game theory principles, the user optimal strategy is to randomly choose between strategies
T and D such that the provider’s system is at the lowest chance of security breaches.
We must have for the user: U user (T) = U user (D)
Let μ = yIS + (1 - y)NIS be the probability mixed strategy NE of the provider. From
basic principles of game theory, the attacker optimal strategy is to randomly choose y such
that the provider is indifferent when deciding between strategies IS and NIS.
We must have for the provider: U prov (IS) = U prov (NIS)
xz(R-e-λ+λα)+x(1-z)(R–e)+(1-x)z(R-e-λ+λα)+(1-x)(1-z)(R–e)=
xz(R-λ)+x(1-z)R+(1-x)z(R-λ)+(1-x)(1-z)R
⟹ z = z 0 = e/(λα)

(5.4)

We know that 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and thus,

U prov (IS) < U prov (NIS)

And also

⟹ 0 ≤ z < z0 ≤ 1

(5.5)

U prov (IS) > U prov (NIS)
⟹ 0 ≤ z0 < z ≤ 1
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(5.6)

Similarly, consider σ = zA + (1-z)NA to be the probability mixed strategy of the attacker.
The attacker randomizes between IS and NIS in such a way that the attacker is indifferent
when choosing strategies IS and NIS. This is translated by:
U att (A) = U att (NA)
⟹ xy(b-pα)+x(1-y)b+(1-x)y(b-pα)+(1-x)(1-y)b=0
⟹b-ypα=0

We know that 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 and thus,

⟹ y = y 0 =b/pα

(5.7)

U att (A) < U att (NA)
⟹ 0 ≤ y < y0 ≤ 1

and

(5.8)

U att (A) > U att (NA)
⟹ 0 ≤ y0 < y ≤ 1

(5.9)

Given the condition in (3) and (5) are verified and the probabilities y and z hold.
Therefore, the strategy profile {T, y 0 IS + (1-y 0 )NIS, z 0 A + (1-z 0 )NA} is a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. However, if the conditions are not met, then we can verify that there is
no possible mixed strategy.
In summary, it is important to the provider to invest in security. The cost or expense e
should be worth the equivalent value of loss. In other word, the effort from the provider in
term of securing the users private information is very important in measured to the impact
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of losing customers because the trust level is low which means the provider’s business is
high risk and untrustworthy. The provider invests commensurably to the worth of its
business may have dual impacts: 1) Users are confident to use the system for business
transactions because of the investment in security and low risk of having their private
information rendered public. 2) The higher the security, the better is the dissuasion to
attacker to breach the system because of the penalty up to prison incarceration if they are
detected and caught.
5.4 NUMERICAL RESULTS
Our game equilibria had provided a detailed exposition of the game model and its
properties. In this section, we derive from the game analysis our numerical results. The
MATLAB simulations support the game-theoretic techniques analyzed in this chapter.
The values we have used in this MATLAB simulation is just to illustrate and provide
concrete examples. The variables used in the calculation of mixed and pure strategy
equilibrium were R, e, p, λ, b, and α. We will assign values to some variables and they
will remain fixed during the entire simulations while others variables increase or
decrease.
For the first scenario, we will set the value of all needed parameters to R = 1, e = 0.2, λ
= 0.6, b = 0.5, p = 0.68 and α is variable. We chose these values as an illustration of a
non-intuitive suggestion of our game model. Figure 5 2 shows that the provider’s payoff
is constant when α< α 0 = 0.33 which is case 1 of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
When the payoff of the provider is constant while the probability α is increasing, the
rational player will be better looking to increase its payoff. However, the case 2 defines
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as another pure strategy Nash equilibrium with α < 0.73. At α ≥ 0.73, there is a change of
strategy from pure to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. There is an attenuation on the
provider’s payoff, which means the frequency of the attack causes the provider to slowly
increase its payoff.

Variation in Provider's Payoff with Probability alpha
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Figure 5.2: Variation in Provider’s Payoff with Probability Alpha

By setting α = 0.51 and R = 0.95, Figure 5.3 shows the strategy change for the pure
Nash equilibrium to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The loss to the provider λ is the
variable in this case. We also can see the three cases of strategic change, the first one
when λ < λ 0 = e/α = 0.39, the second pure strategy is the case where (0.39 ≤ λ ≤ 0.84)
and the major shift occurs at the λ=0.84 when the provider’s payoff reaches 0.34.
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Moreover, the shift is to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The decrease in value is
for the provider’s payoff its way of showing that it’s not rewarded by the game when the
loss increases.
Variations in Provider's Payoff with the Loss due to Security Breach
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Figure 5.3: Variations in Provider’s Payoff with the Loss due to Security Breach

The expense e translates as the cost to improve the security of the provider’s
infrastructure against an attack. From the values selected, we have the provider’s payoff
constant until it reaches e = e 0 = 0.3 in expense and it follows with a decrease in payoff
for provider because the investment in security is paying off. There is a drop in payoff for
the provider when he invests e > 0.73; the provider’s payoff is negative. If the provider
can invest in security up to e ≥ 0.7 the loss due to attack will be minimal with less impact
to the users’ privacy or manageable loss of private information. The mixed strategy NE
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indicates that the attacker may willing to target the provider’s system with a high risk of
getting caught and low risk of getting breach.
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Figure 5.4: Variations in Provider’s payoff
The game clearly admits multiple Nash equilibrium strategies and the expense e will
provide guidance to players’ choice.
Figure 5.5 shows that the attacker’s payoff drastically dropped when there is any
investment made by the service provider to improve the security of its infrastructure. If
the parameter α that represents the probability of an attacker getting detected or caught on
the provider’s system is over 0.5 (alpha ≥ 0.5) the expected probability of the attacker of
not getting detected or caught is under 0.1. In case the attacker relies on its probability
gain from figure 5.5, it will be to the best interest of the service provider to invest in the
security component by increasing the expense e, which will also increase the probability
α and it will be good to have α ≥ 0.5.
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Figure 5.5: Variations in Attacker’s payoff

5.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we optimize the trust between the users and the provider by the use of
the game theoretic approach. The three player game in this case provides a quantitative
approach to perform a cost analysis of the security investment. The provider does not have
the luxury to not invest in security. Any online service network where customers provide
their private information should show concern with protecting consumers’ data.
This research takes into account the action of all the players. The game has multiple
possible Nash equilibria that can be converted into pure strategy or mixed strategy under
specific conditions. Our research finds that an increase in the frequency of attack and the
provider able to mitigate the loss might cause the attacker to be detected and caught. Thus,
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the limited benefit generated by the attack may force the attacker to not attack because of
the risk and penalties.
For future work, we plan to investigate and apply a game to come up with an optimal
function for mapping the gain when the provider invests in security and the loss when the
attacker succeeds in targeting the provider’s infrastructure and the users’ private data are
compromised, this will clearly refine the payoff of each player.
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CHAPTER 6
A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITH
COLLUDING NODES IN MANETS

Prevalent concerns with dynamic networks typically involve security. Especially with
resource constraints in dynamic networks such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs),
security needs to be of particular consideration. In this chapter, we first analyze the
solution concept involved in optimizing resource allocation and data packet forwarding.
In a MANET, the availability of having data packets forwarded may be insubstantial due
to the presence of selfish nodes. Nodes may not want to participate in the network to
preserve their own resources. We propose a packet-forwarding problem with a
negotiation game, where an arbitrator acts as a cluster head and initiates a bargaining
game. Thereafter, we consider the possibility of having some group of nodes exhibit
malicious behavior and collude to subvert the MANET. We investigate the problem by
finding the optimal Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies of the negotiation game. Then, we
simulate the effect of the coalition of malicious nodes in a mobile environment.
Simulation results support our model.
6.1

INTRODUCTION

There has been significant growth in research involving terminal mobility in dynamic
networks. One category of such networks is a MANET. In a MANET, autonomous
mobile devices are deployed across the area of a network. The device mobility, the
absence of infrastructure, and wireless communication render the topology unstable.
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Because of these characteristics, as well as resource limitations in energy such as battery
life, mobile devices may face issues with connectivity and link reliability. This limited
nature of resources in a MANET encourages some nodes to behave selfishly by
attempting to preserve their own resources. As a result, the only way for data packets to
move throughout the network is if these mobile devices rely on one another to transfer
data. The reliability of the network depends on this level of cooperation. In order for
data packets to be delivered from one node to another, nodes must have an incentive to be
participative [49].
Existing literature provides methods on incentive mechanisms as ways to alleviate the
effect of having selfish nodes in a MANET. We consider the novel implementation of an
arbitrator in a MANET to initiate a bargaining game with players. The arbitrator will
offer shares of its data storage as a way to optimize resource allocation in the network.
These shares are fractions of the arbitrator’s data storage and are randomly distributed to
players. Players involved in the game will be allowed to accept or reject these offers
from the arbitrator. A vote by simple majority will decide if data transfer will complete a
negotiation session [31]. By the time a player is out of transmission range if the majority
of players have not agreed on their resource allocation, the negotiation game ends. This
implementation into the model will help maximize network reliability and increase the
throughput in the MANETs. Researchers have also considered the presence of malicious
behavior in dynamic networks [10] [22]. The lack of robust security measures can be
considered a result of a MANET’s limitation. Although many types of attacks exist,
many of them focus on deteriorating the resources and services of the network. We
consider a particular kind of malicious behavior in the model proposed in this chapter. In
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this model, a group of mobile devices can collude among itself to exploit the
functionality of the arbitrator. Constant exposure to collusion will eventually degrade
network reliability. This chapter investigates the bargaining game and how the proposed
solution can be used to analyze the behavior of colluding nodes. There are researches in
the field of mobile ad-hoc networks and some security concerns are perceivable. To
improve the network reliability, Buttyan and Hubaux [50] proposed virtual currency as a
way to stimulate participation in data packet forwarding. The authors proposed, each
node earns certain amounts of “nuglets” that is used to transfer data. When a node
requests to have data packets forwarded, the “nuglet” count decrements by one, and
when a node forwards a data packet, the “nuglet” count increments by one. However,
The solution concept, does not consider the scenario of not having enough currency to
proceed with forwarding requests.
In [24], Liou et al. considered a bargaining game as a way of handling the access
network selection.

Possible access networks include wireless metropolitan access

networks (WMANs), third generation/code division multiple access (3G/CDMA), and
wireless local area networks (WLANs).

The authors introduced a bargaining game

between the participating device and the access network, such that the resource allocation
of the network is negotiated between the two players after a call request is made.
Although the game attempts to optimize resource allocations of the network, it requires
that nodes are constituents of a network where devices may be mobile but the base station
must remain static. Marti et al. [22] introduced a technique to improve throughput in ad
hoc networks. The proposed technique is built on top of the Dynamic Source Routing
(DSR) protocol. To alleviate routing misbehavior in particular, the technique involves
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categorizing nodes as either watchdog nodes or pathrater nodes. The watchdog node
seeks to identify misbehaving nodes, while the pathrater node uses its information of
misbehaving nodes to decide a better, more reliable route to take to proceed with data
transfer. However, Implementing the technique, can lead to collision problems, false
reports in behaviors, and collusion.
In [45], Niyato et al. addressed the problematic and dynamic issues of network access
selection in heterogeneous networks by studying the application of evolutionary game
theory. Users in the network compete for shares of bandwidth availability, where the
following competition is modeled as an evolutionary game solvable by finding its
evolutionary equilibrium. Two featured algorithms for network selection are scrutinized.
The influence of the users competing for shares is noted in this study.
The mobility functionalities described in [41] are categorized as a mobile sink or
mobile relay, which define methods either in collecting data or passing them on to the
next mobile entity. These mobile nodes use their short radio transmission ranges to
accumulate data efficiently. Furthermore, using parameters of a service-driven MANET
as a foundation, Riordan and Grigoras [52] proposed the implementation of a data mule
service appropriate for network needs. This data mule is typically highly mobile and is
deployed in the area where it can be used to transmit data packets between the requester
and the client. Boudec and Buchegger [64] proposed an extension of the routing protocol
as the method for detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes.

The proposed work

essentially builds on the idea that nodes will learn from behavior by participating in
“neighborhood watch” and sharing experiences concerning malicious behavior. After
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receiving warning information on some particular malicious nodes, a path manager will
reconfigure which safe paths to take for data exchange.

The method calls for

improvements in the data link layer and employs the Dynamic Source Routing protocol.
In [41], Rossi et al. presented an intrusion detection system where collusion is
considered in improving path reliability. In the intrusion detection system, the pathrater
algorithm categorizes nodes into several different classes. Essentially, full participation
in the network depends on the rating associated with class membership. Simulated
results show that the system has improved tolerance for collusion among malicious
nodes. However, The system, does not support statistical analysis based on optimal
threshold values.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. System models and motivations
are surveyed in the Section 6.2, game-theoretic analysis is provided in Section 6.3,
simulation environment and results are presented in Section 6.4, and conclusion and
future works are articulated in Section 6.5.
6.2

MODELS AND MOTIVATIONS

This section introduces the system model under Problem Description and Network
Model. Motivations behind this study are briefly provided in the final part.
6.2.1

Problem Description

Let the MANET have any number of nodes, N, from 1 to N, positioned throughout an
area, such that the nodes can be rigidly placed or mounted onto some mobile object. By
means of a MANET, nodes share characteristics of both a router and a broadcast access
point. Meaning, a node can store and collect data packets, as well as connect to some
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other routing device [5]. As nodes of a MANET are usually limited in resources such as
battery life and computational power, it is not favorable for nodes to forward data under
requests other than their own. However, it is required for nodes to forward data packets
in order to benefit the overall network.

Establishing connections among nodes is

therefore an expected challenge by the mobile and infrastructureless nature of a MANET
[1]. To mitigate the adverse effects of having selfish nodes in the network, our proposed
model requires an arbitrator to serve as a cluster head and negotiate shares of its own
data-storing resource to allocate to those in need of data packet forwarding.

This

functionality of the arbitrator gives nodes incentive to participate in the network. The
main concern with the current model is that it assumes that nodes will act independently
when bargaining with the arbitrator. As a result, the possibility of malicious nodes
colluding to deteriorate network reliability is considered here, which comes from the
postulation that a group of nodes can coordinate together to bargain with the arbitrator.
6.2.2

Network Model

The MANET is considered as an area of locally deployed wireless devices (access
points) based on IEEE 802.11 standards [24] [6]. The key features of the current model
remain consistent in this model. Mobile objects are deployed throughout the area where
they can represent cruisers, fire trucks, planes, etc. The access points distributed across
the local area network will serve as data repositories for the accumulated data.
Furthermore, the mobility of the nodes in a MANET is arbitrary, with the location of
each node contained in three-dimensional space. Each node covers a dynamically sized
area of the network over some random and freely determined speed and direction.
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Variable-sized areas of coverage represent realistic expectations in a MANET. For
example, suppose that devices are mounted on a helicopter and a police cruiser.
Although both vehicles are free to move any which way, the helicopter may cover a
broader area in comparison to the cruiser.
The waypoint model supports the mobility of these nodes. Waypoints are random
vectors uniformly distributed across the specified area. The nodes move accordingly
over time until they reach their waypoint. When a node reaches its waypoint, it may
pause and reconfigure its waypoint parameters. Furthermore, we consider interactions
between regular nodes and any one arbitrator. A regular node will normally request its
need for data packets to be forwarded across the network, and the request will then be
broadcasted to the node’s neighbors for help. With enough requests from a group of
regular nodes, an arbitrator will offer its service and resources, provided it has enough
resources of its own to sustain its service [66] [62] [65].
6.2.3

Motivations

Current research on the topic of MANETs may only consider the event of rational and
selfish nodes existing in the network. In which case, the resource allocation problem is
directly addressed.

This is easily supported since nodes in a MANET are

characteristically constrained and limited by battery life, computational power, etc.
However, it is for these same reasons that MANETs are also not secure. For example,
limited computational power can limit a mobile device by making cryptographic
procedures impossible or simply impractical if by having these security features drains
the battery of the device as well [49].
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We first consider the case when a regular node requests packets to be transferred. The
node runs the routing algorithm to find the shortest path required to transfer data, then
follows typical procedures of incentive or reward programs in order for other nodes to
cooperate with the request. Setting arbitrators as data mules [52] and having them with a
wider transmission range allow such nodes to be beneficiaries of the arbitrator’s services.
The arbitrator’s data-carrying capability and broader range should reduce the number of
hops required to pass data packets from a source to a destination. As requests to have
data packets transferred accumulate, the arbitrator will have to consider more allocations
of its resources. It will implement the round robin algorithm and the handshaking
procedure of the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) to
relieve communication density and to address the hidden node problem. We also consider
the opportunity a node has to collude and bring malicious intent to the network.
Malicious nodes will try to use all the resources, of the participating nodes in a network
such as battery life, that its reliability is eventually compromised. As mentioned before,
many security threats exist in a MANET due to the very nature of its design as a network.
Such threats include, but are not limited to blackhole attacks, denial-of-service attacks,
routing loop attacks, and Sybil attacks [28].
In this framework, malicious nodes may cooperate to compromise the functionality of
the arbitrator. Since the model requires that the arbitrator initiate a bargaining game with
players making requests to have packets forwarded to the destination, and the success of
the game depends on the majority vote of all players, a particular group of players may
collude to upset the vote. Subverting the voting mechanism across all games in the
MANET causes the deterioration of network reliability. In addition to this, prolonging
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any given bargaining game by evasion of a successful vote wastes the power and battery
life of the arbitrator, thus exhausting its purpose.
6.3

GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS

The following summarizes the method for optimizing resource allocations between an
arbitrator and a regular node [49].
6.3.1

Negotiation Model

Let there be a set of nodes in the network such that N = {1,2,…,n} represents the set of
players eligible for negotiation. Note that the arbitrator is independent of this defined set
of players. The unique feature of the arbitrator lies in its data storage capability and its
wider transmission range. The arbitrator’s data storage capability also characterizes it as
a data mule [52]. When nodes make requests to have data packets forwarded, the
arbitrator will receive the requests and initiate a bargaining session. The length of time of
the bargaining session will depend on the positions of the nodes involved and how long it
will take for the first player to move out of range of the arbitrator. As soon as any player
leaves the arbitrator’s transmission range, negotiation will cease to continue.
After requests are made, the full length of time before the first player exits the
arbitrator’s transmission range is calculated, and the number of cycles, or shots, of
negotiations are estimated. In each cycle, the arbitrator will offer shares of its resources
to each player, so that the size of each share are randomly determined. This arbitrary
manner of allocation eliminates the possibility of any kind of bias or partiality in
forwarding data.
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After the arbitrator offers resource shares in the first shot, each player in the game will
have the opportunity to accept or reject the offer. If the simple majority, defined as being
more than half of players in the current shot accepts their offered shares of resources, data
transfer will occur. Otherwise, if the majority rejects the offer, the session will proceed
to the next shot or cycle. At the very last shot, equal shares of the resource will be
offered, and if the majority decides to reject the offers at the final shot, data transfer will
not occur during the session.
6.3.2

Random Distribution and Optimal Strategies

The random assignment of share sizes is represented by the Dirichlet distribution,
which is essentially the set of probability distributions specified by some vector k. The
sum of all outcomes of the distribution is equal to 1, such that the sum is proportional to
the entire size of the arbitrator’s data storage.
The distribution takes observations of n possible outcomes with positive real
parameters x i , i=1,…,n, and the probability density function (pmf) of the Dirichlet
distribution (Dir) for variable vector x i = (x 1 , x 2 ,…, x n ) with the parameter vector (k 1 , …,
k n ) is given as
Dir ( x; k ) =

n
n
1
xiki −1 , xi ≥ 0, ∑ xi = 1, k i ≥ 1.
∏
B (k ) i =1
i =1

(6.1)

such that B(k) in the formula
B ( k ) = B ( k1 ,..., k n ) =

∏

n

i =1

Γ(ki )

Γ( k1 + ... + k n )
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,

(6.2)

is dependent on parameters (k 1 , …, k n ), where they serve for modifying the weights of the
distribution. The density is asymmetric if k is not a constant vector. The operation Γ
represents the Gamma function.
Consider the negotiation game between the simple case of three players, and in a given
negotiation cycle, random offers from vector (x 1 k, x 2 k, x 3 k) are generated using the
Dirichlet distribution. Suppose U k denotes the value of the negotiation game with k shots
remaining and o(x i ), i = 1, 2, 3, represent the probability that player i accepts the offer x i .
Finally, let ō(x) = 1 - o(x). We analyze the following.
Theorem 1: The optimal strategies of players at shot k possess the form
ο i ( xi ) = Ι{ x ≥δU
i

k −1 }

, i = 1,2,3.

(6.3)

The utility value of the game for player i satisfies the formula
Uk =

1
− 2δ 2U k2−1 + 6δ 3U k3−1
3

(6.4)

Proof: The proof of this theorem derives the proof theorem 5.2 in chapter 5
When δ = 1, which represents the case of no discounting, and the horizon of
negotiations is infinite, we come to the conclusion that lim k→∞ U k = ⅓, and players should
accept the resource shares that the arbitrator offers.
6.3.3

Threat Model

Malicious nodes colluding to subvert the network are typically characterized by any
instance of intentionally wasting the resources and reliability of the network. In this
model with arbitration, colluding nodes are considered as those that request significantly
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larger shares of resource allocation.

By consistently requesting significantly larger

shares, the colluding nodes are seeking to exploit the arbitrator’s data carrying capability.
As a result, and as previously mentioned, since data transfers are administered by simple
majority votes, colluding nodes may also manipulate any given negotiation session by
consistently rejecting their offers over the specified number of cycles.
A

C

D

B

Figure 6.1: A simplification of colluding nodes interacting with both an arbitrator and a
regular node in a bargaining session

In Figure 1, let A represent the arbitrator holding a bargaining session with nodes B, C,
and D. Node B is a regular node that is selfish and behaves rationally. Nodes C and D
are colluding to deteriorate the services of the network. Let node B bear a minimum
payload of ¼ the storage of the arbitrator, A, and let nodes B and C bear minimum
payloads of ½ each. If for example the calculated number of cycles in a bargaining
session is 3, then for each cycle, the majority vote to accept offers will never pass
throughout the session, even at the final shot when equal allocations are offered.
6.3.4

System Modifications and Nash Equilibria

The negotiation model investigated in this chapter will maintain its key components,
such as requests to forward data, responses to such requests, randomly generated offers,
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and majority-vote decisions. However, in this proposed investigation, instead of having
equal allocations offered at the final shot of the negotiation session, we will consider
offering equal allocations at the initial shot of the session.
We consider this conjecture as we acknowledge the simulation results in [49], which
shows that successful negotiation sessions typically follow from having minimum
payloads per player below 1/n, where n is the set of all players involved in a given
session. Also note that any involved strategy profile in which an arbitrator randomly
generates offers is a Nash equilibrium. Resource allocations are optimized and rational
players are anticipated to accept the offer.
6.4
6.4.1

SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
Design Description

Although a MANET realistically exists in the third dimension, the proposed system
model will be analyzed in two-dimension. Furthermore, the total area of coverage is
simulated in a 100m x 100m region and there are sub-areas defined for arbitrators. A
selected arbitrator has an assigned sub-area of coverage. A single arbitrator is randomly
situated in a sub-area and continues its movement within the perimeter of the sub-area
throughout simulation time. The arbitrator also serves as the cluster head of mobile
nodes contained in the same sub-area, when the node requests arbitrator’s service.
The model also includes a predetermined amount of nodes colluding to subvert the
network, with the minimum number of colluding nodes being 2. Colluding nodes are
placed at one hop distance away from each other. Regular nodes are then distributed
randomly to all sub-areas. For purposes of illustration and analyzing the effects of
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collusion, the exemplary design will have 4 arbitrators, 3 colluding members, and 7
regular nodes deployed across the area. Arbitrators will primarily have a transmission
range of 71m, while regular nodes will primarily have the transmission range of 40m.

Figure 6.2: A screenshot of 10 mobile nodes, comprised of two colluding nodes and one
arbitrator and one regular node in each subarea
Figure 6.2 illustrates a simplest scenario of the network model. Note that the Random
Waypoint model dictates the mobility of each node [66]. The endpoint of any single
node’s path is uniformly distributed across the area, and the node travels on the path by
some random velocity. Reaching an endpoint, the node may pause before continuing on
to another waypoint. Table 6.1 summarizes the critical features of the simulated model.
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Parameter

Parameter Values

Simulation Time

500 sec

Routing Protocol

AODV

Total Number of Nodes

15, 20, 30

Number of Arbitrators

4

Initial Node Position

Randomly Distributed

Mobility Model

Random Waypoint

Simulation Area

100m x 100m

Channel Type

Wireless

Node Speed Interval

0.2m/s – 2.6m/s

Traffic Type

Constant Bitrate

Time Step

0.1 sec
Table 6.1: Simulation Details

The resource sharing functionality of the arbitrator is randomly assigned via a random
generator distribution. An arbitrator will carry a unit of data storage that can be allocated
to each node requesting to have a data-packet forwarded. A node, for example, may
request at least 1/3 of the storage, and this share is also the node’s minimum payload. In
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this model design, the arbitrator’s data storage is determined to contain 10,000 units (i.e.
10,000 bytes), and any negotiated share will be a portion of that total value.
When nodes request to have their data forwarded, the arbitrator initiates a bargaining
session. Note that requests from various source nodes to forward data packets will be
made to the same destination node. In order for a node situated in one subarea to forward
data packets to another node situated in a different subarea, it is expected that requests
will be made through two arbitrators. With this in mind, the assumption is made that if
an arbitrator requests to have data packets forwarded to another arbitrator, the first
arbitrator will not participate in the bargaining session prescribed by the second
arbitrator.
6.4.2

Simulation Results

In order to analyze the effect of the bargaining game on collusion, a selection of
values must from table 6.1 are assigned to the parameters.
We first investigate various ranges of minimum payloads. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4
provide the percentages of successful negotiation sessions over simulation time.
Following Figure 6.3, regular, non-colluding nodes are randomly set to have minimum
payloads between 1667-3334 bytes, while colluding nodes will have minimum payloads
between 4000-5000 bytes. These values are fractions of the total assigned storage space
of 10000 bytes. Since colluding nodes are requesting significantly larger shares of
storage, we expect nearly all voting procedures to upset occurring bargaining games.
Figure 6.3 exhibits relatively consistent percentages of successful votes over simulation
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time. By the end of the 500s, negotiation games are about 76% successful without
collusion, while negotiation games are 37.1% successful with collusion.
Figure 6.4 illustrates a similar conclusion with the exception of colluding nodes
having payloads within 3500-4000 bytes. In the first 100s of negotiations, we exhibit
sporadic instances of successful votes, as well as network performance reaching its peak
with collusion in the network, showing that negotiation games may still be notably
successful even with the presence of colluding nodes.
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Figure 6.3: Percentage of successful negotiation sessions with minimum payload
between 1667-3334 bytes
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Figure 6.4: Percentage of successful negotiation sessions with minimum payload
between 3500-4000 bytes

We then investigate the impact of having various ranges of velocities the nodes will
have to adopt and how they relate to percentages of successful votes. Test cases of speed
are the following: 0.2-1.0 m/s, 2.0-3.2 m/s, 5.0-6.2 m/s, 8.1-10.2 m/s, 12.1-13.2 m/s, and
14.1-15.2 m/s. Although values are sporadic and inconsistent depending on the range of
speeds, negotiation games are generally more successful when either regular nodes and
colluding nodes have relatively lower mobility (low speed). Evaluating the plots in
figure 5, we notice that when the minimum payloads of colluding nodes are within 40005000 units, the percentage of successful games more consistently deteriorates as speed
ranges increase. This confirms the expectation that network reliability is compromised
with higher minimum payloads and increased of speeds. Aside from this observation, we
also note that different speeds have drastically affected the performance and outcomes of
negotiation sessions. Moreover, nodes may want to reach a bargaining success, but the
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high mobility of each node may cause the communication to break because the
transmission is out of range.
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Figure 6.5: Successful negotiation over speed variations
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Figure 6.6. Successful negotiation over discount factors

120

In Figure 6.6, the relationship between successful negotiation sessions and various
discount factors is investigated.

Test cases of the respective delta values are the

following: 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.40, and 0.50. Discount factors affect
the size of resource allocations made in a successful negotiation session. Because big
discounts take away a fraction of the resources over a horizon of negotiation cycles,
network reliability and success rate of negotiations should deteriorate. Figure 6.6 also
illustrates the case when colluding nodes have minimum payloads within 3500-4000
units. The study shows that further discounting on top of collusion present in the network
significantly worsens network performance. Results also show that when delta is set at
0.05, the lowest delta value applied and tested, the network still performs
uncharacteristically and relatively well even with collusion. The network performance is
better when the network contains colluding nodes than when the network does not
contain colluding nodes. For that matter, the network can tolerate having colluded nodes,
but it is obvious that successful negotiation decreases rapidly.
6.5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This chapter models the problem of colluding mobile nodes in a heterogeneous mobile
ad-hoc network of N nodes using bargaining game theoretic concept as an incentive to
share resources on-the-fly and where the nodes negotiate with an arbitrator on the sharing
rule of consent. We investigate the perfect equilibrium strategies of this bargaining game,
by observing how each player maximized his throughput against the colluded nodes.
Simulated results show that the bargaining game and its effect of optimizing resource
allocations can be utilized to reveal the presence of malicious nodes colluding to subvert
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the network.

Since such colluding nodes will tend to request larger shares of the

arbitrator’s resource and data carrying capability, they will consequently reject offers
involved in playing optimal Nash equilibrium strategies. Simulated results also show that
the loss of network reliability is a direct result of the malicious behavior of colluding
nodes. Furthermore, through simulation, we investigate the impact of discount factor (δ)
on mobility, fairness and patient during a bargaining session, and we can argue that δ→1
is a negligible value in our problem. Broadcasting the identity of colluding nodes by the
arbitrator and their constant rejection of any offers may expose their presence in the
network and dismantle the collusion. Therefore, improving security and the quality of the
network.
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CHAPTER 7
CYBER SECURITY RESOURCE ALLOCATION: A MARKOV DECISION
PROCESS APPROACH

An effective defense-in-depth in cyber security applies multiple layers of defense
throughout a system. The goal is to defend a system against cyber-attack using several
independent methods. Therefore, a cyber-attack that is able to penetrate one layer of
defense may be unsuccessful in other layers. Common layers of cyber defense include:
attack avoidance, prevention, detection, survivability and recovery. It follows that in
security-conscious organizations, the cyber security investment portfolio is divided into
different layers of defense. For instance, a two-way division is agility and recovery.
Cyber agility pursues attack avoidance techniques such that cyber-attacks are rendered as
ineffective; whereas, cyber recovery seeks to fight-through successful attacks. We show
that even when the primary focus is on the agility of a system, recovery should be an
essential point during implementation because the frequency of attacks will degrade the
system and a quick and fast recovery is necessary. However, there is not yet an optimal
mechanism to allocate limited cyber security resources into the different layers. We
propose an approach using the Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework for resource
allocation between the two end layers: agility and recovery.
7.1

INTRODUCTION

The goal of cyber agility is to reduce attacks by making it harder for a determined
adversary to succeed. This is achieved by preventing adversaries from planning their
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attacks over time by relying on the static nature of the networks, and launching their
attacks at the times and places of their choosing. Cyber agility employs proactive and
adaptive defense techniques that include randomization, diversity and obfuscation, to
increase the levels of complexity and uncertainty in a system and disrupt adversary attack
planning and execution.
However, if a system administrator fully invests his cyber security resources to develop
the most robust and agile systems against cyber-attack, there is no guarantee that the
system will be able to avoid all attacks. In fact, it is not always possible for a system
administrator to anticipate all component failures or intelligent attacks perpetrated against
its modules. Attempts to predict and protect against every conceivable failure and attack
become cumbersome and costly. Additionally, novel, well-orchestrated, malicious attacks
can cause damages that are far beyond the abilities of most system developers to
anticipate.
Regardless of how well a system is designed and secured or how well they can
circumvent vulnerabilities and attacks, it will eventually show some unseen
vulnerabilities, which are exploitable by attackers. Therefore, a mission-critical system
implemented and placed in cyberspace should have the resources to recover from a
degraded state and still carry out at least the mission essential functions (MEFs).
Cyber resilience comprises the ability to withstand, minimize, survive, and recover from
the negative effects of adversity, whether man-made or natural, under all circumstances of
use. Resilient systems must not only provide the continuation of Mission Essential
Functions in the face of disruption by a sophisticated adversary or a non-malicious fault,
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but also fight through successful attacks to regain or even exceed their initial operational
capability. Cyber resilience invests in recovery solutions that increase the probability of
assuring MEFs during and after a successful cyber-attack.
Resource allocation in a network system between avoidance and recovery is most
pressing for mission-critical systems. One of the challenges faced by any system
administrator is to provide equal and adequate systems security preparedness for both
threat avoidance and recovery from threats. This work proposes a mechanism to optimally
allocate limited cyber security resources into different layers of cyber defense. The main
contribution of this research work is to find the optimal allocations of cyber security
resources during the development and deployment of mission critical system using the
Markov Decision Process (MDP).
In the literature, there are some studies related to optimal resource allocations. The use
of the MDP to address network security challenges has increased. The reason is that the
MDP modeling supports a broad understanding of attacks and interactions in cyberspace.
Arshad et al. [83] presented a semi-Markov decision based fair buffer allocation policy
for sensor nodes and vehicular network. The proposed model gives nodes a fair chance to
transmit its data. There is a tradeoff between energy efficiency and fairness at the relay
node. Also, there is an increase in the number of nodes competing for buffer also results in
an increased fair buffer allocation, but the authors did not mention or discuss the
proportion of resources needed.
Game theory is proposed in [73] as a modeling tool and computing for the probabilities
of the expected behavior of the attackers in a quantitative stochastic model of security.
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The stochastic model presented by the author analyzes a security breach as a series of
intentional state changes. Assumptions are made for the possible rewards of a player in the
game, allowing the calculation of the Mean Time to First Security Breach (MTFSB) for
the system. The benefit of using the game theoretic approach is twofold: first, provide a
more accurate model of the attackers’ behavior, which can be used to assign more realistic
transition probabilities in the models, and second, help the defender of the system to find
optimal defense strategies and facilitate the calculation of the expected loss associated
with different strategies.
In [25], the problem of sharing a resource with a time-varying capacityis presented. The
objective of minimizing the mean-delay was investigated. The resource allocation is
formulated as a MDP. Even though, the problem is not solvable analytically in its
generality, an approximation of the solution is obtained. The authors in [63] proposed an
On-line Social Network (OSN) service, an approach for helping OSN users determine
their optimum levels of information sharing based on the Markov decision process while
taking into consideration the payoffs (potential Reward or Cost). In [63], a decision
algorithm was proposed for vertical handoff in heterogeneous wireless networks. The
algorithm is based on an MDP formulation with objectives to maximize the expected
reward of a connection. A stationary deterministic policy is obtained when the connection
termination time is geometrically distributed.
The authors in [69] addressed some issues to initiate path optimization for a two-phase
handoff protocol. The use of link cost function is to reflect the network resources utilized
by a connection. The optimal policy performance has been compared with four heuristics.
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The proposed model captured the tradeoff between network resources used and the
handoff processing and signaling load incurred in the network. There is a drawback in the
formulation when it comes to traffic distribution between voice and multimedia
applications.
Ayesta et al. [68] investigated the problem of sharing resources of a single server with
time-varying capacity. The main objective of the investigation is to minimize the mean
delay. Nevertheless, the problem does not have an analytical solution. The motivation in
this case is to seek an approximate solution. Two examples are provided for illustration:
the extension of multi-armed bandits to develop a heuristic solution of index type and the
Gittins index rule known to be optimal under the assumption of constant capacity.
Chunlei et al. in [75] proposed a network of threat evolution model based on network
threat evolutionary behaviors, network threat propagations and also investigated the
influence of network threats over network survivability. By abstracting network
survivability as a dynamic game process among attacker, defender and normal users, the
proposed network survivability analysis is experimented in a typical network environment.
7.1.1

Background

Computer network systems are always targets of cyber attackers. Network systems
deployed online should be capable of sustaining the adversity of cyber-attacks coupled
with component deterioration by integrating agility and recovery component.
Agility: In cybersecurity, agility is a system that has the property to remain operational
and deliver desired and acceptable results by auto-circumventing or bypassing some
vulnerability or issue that surged. For example, the implementation by the system
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administrator of an IP-Hopping, (a moving target defense system), will use available
network data and hopping algorithms to allow a constant IP addresses to randomly change
on both source and destination IP addresses [84]. The use of "hopping" IP addresses will
severely diminish an attacker's ability to breach a target within a network because of the
increased uncertainty of identifying the IP address of a port. Each time the attacker scans
the network, he gets a different IP address. Therefore, it is difficult to locate an access
point [70].
Recovery: The recovery component of a system is the ability for a system that has
suffered from an attack to regain its initial operating capability as soon as possible [62].
The implementation of recovery components and procedures in a system facilitates the
switch back to a running state in a timely manner [72]. Survivability is the aptitude for a
system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or
accidents. As example, the database system of a financial institution may suffer
unrecoverable loss from cyber-attacks. With the implementation of a disaster recovery
mechanism, there is less data lost and quick turnaround. The database (data and logs) can
be fragmented and installed on multiple hard drives with backups equipped in each hard
drive. The backup is done in two steps; there can be a daily full backup and an hourly
differential-backup. On a system’s breach from attack, one of the production node’s
servers and database are down. When the server node is brought back on, the data
recovery procedure is fast by doing a data rebuild from the backups. The database system
is prepared for restoration, so that it may be ready to move on the production environment.
Resource allocation is one of the important challenges in cyber security, especially when
the systems have some Service Level Agreements (SLAs). In the cyber world, the main
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functionalities of the system need to be active and running. However, mission-critical
systems are usually constrained during design and implementation to have agility
properties integrated. Specifically, the administrator mostly allocates the investment on the
agility design and implementation. Therefore, it may not be to the system lifetime’s best
interest to have investment focus only on agility. However, refusal to allocate the
investment’s portion on recovery will severely hinder the mission-critical system’s
lifetime and impair the system’s own performance. Hence, it is necessary to highly
consider investment on recovery for any system deployed in the cyber world and where
different interactions from different players change the states of the system.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the model
formulation. In section 7.2, we describe the problem. We formulate the problem as a
Markov chain in section 7.3. The Markov decision process is analyzed in section 7.4.
Numerical results are in section 7.5, and the conclusion of the chapter sums up the main
contributions, as well as future work.
7.2

MODEL FORMULATION

We consider that a system can be in one of the two states: state 1, when it’s up and
running and state 0, which is off, degraded or non-functional. Actions based on malicious
or normal behavior can cause the system to switch from state 1 to state 0 with a certain
probability. The system in state 1 integrates defense layers, such as agility, avoidance and
prevention to stay in state 1. A successful attack or a component failure can change the
state of the system from state 1 to state 0. The system in state 0 needs a good recovery
mechanism to come back to state 1, otherwise it stays and remains in state 0.
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The two-state system is represented as a Markov chain, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Two-state Markov chain

Figure 7.1 shows a state diagram with transition probabilities, as defined:
P 00 = 1 – p: is the probability that the system stays in state 0.
P 01 = p: is the probability that the system switches from state 0 to state 1.
P 11 = q: the probability that the system remains in state 1.
P 10 = 1 - q: the probability that the system switches from state 1 to state 0
We have a state transition matrix defined as follows:
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃 = � 00
𝑃𝑃10

𝑃𝑃01
1 − 𝑝𝑝
�=�
𝑃𝑃11
1 − 𝑞𝑞

𝑝𝑝
�
𝑞𝑞

(7.1)

We can observe that an increased investment in cyber agility will increase the
probability q, whereas an increased investment in cyber recovery will increase the
probability p.
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7.2.1

Operational Scenario with a Two-state Markov Chain

We have a state transition matrix defined in equation (7.1) [63]. In order to explain our
approach, we assume that an attacker tries to compromise the system by changing it to a
degraded state (state 0) [83]. Meanwhile, the defense team (system administrator) has two
objectives:
1.

Make a successful attack difficult to reach its objective (increase q) and the system

to remain in state 1 i.e., cyber agility.
2.

Provide a solution to recover from potential failure (state 0) and quickly switch the

system to state 1 which is the functional state, i.e., cyber recovery.
We consider that a defender, who allocates security resources between agility and
recovery, maximizes the long-term fraction of time during which the system is in state 1.
Using the transition probability q (respectively p), the steady-state probabilities indicate
the long-term fraction of time during which the system is in state 1 (respectively, switches
from state 0 to state 1). Given that the system is in state 1 at time 0, there is a need to
know the probability that the system remains UP (state 1) at the time when n is very large.
The eigenvalues of matrix P are λ 1 = 1 and λ 2 = q - p. Since p and q are probability
values, |λ 2 | ≤ 1. P can be expressed in a diagonal form.
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆 −1 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

1
=�
1

−𝑝𝑝
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 λ1
��
𝑞𝑞
0
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞

1 − 𝑞𝑞
0
��
λ2 1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞
−1

𝑝𝑝
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 �
1

(7.2)

where D is a diagonal matrix, S is the matrix of eigenvectors and S-1 is its inverted.
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The value s i , the ith row S, is the left eigenvector of matrix of transition P corresponding
to λ i meaning 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 a verified 2-step transition matrix is

1

=�

1

𝑃𝑃 (𝑛𝑛)
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 = � 00
𝑃𝑃10 (𝑛𝑛)

−𝑝𝑝
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 𝜆𝜆1𝑛𝑛
��
𝑞𝑞
0
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞

𝑃𝑃01 (𝑛𝑛)
� = 𝑆𝑆 −1 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆
𝑃𝑃11 (𝑛𝑛)

1 − 𝑞𝑞
0
�
�
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛2 1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞
−1

𝑝𝑝
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 �
1

(7.3)

While extracting the common factor, we have
𝜆𝜆1𝑛𝑛
1 − 𝑞𝑞
�
𝑃𝑃 =
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 1 − 𝑞𝑞
𝑛𝑛

with λ 1 = 1; λ 2 = q - p.

𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛2
𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝
�+
�−1 + 𝑞𝑞
𝑝𝑝
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞

−𝑝𝑝
1 − 𝑞𝑞 �

(7.4)

Let us examine the state probability vector p(n) as n becomes very large.
The vector 𝜋𝜋 = [ 𝜋𝜋0 𝜋𝜋1 ]′ = lim 𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)
𝑛𝑛→∞

The initial state is state 1, the state probability at time n
lim 𝜋𝜋1 =

𝑛𝑛→∞

𝑝𝑝
−𝑝𝑝0 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝1 (1 − 𝑞𝑞)
𝑝𝑝
+ 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛2
=
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞
1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞

(7.5)

With λ 2 = q – p < 1.

This chain converges to the stationary distribution regardless of where it begins.
The vector π = [π 0 π 1 ] is called the equilibrium distribution of the chain.
7.2.2

Tradeoff: Agility vs Recovery

We assume that P 10 > 0 or 0<q<1. The system administrator cannot guarantee at 100%
that the system will not change from state 1 to state 0. The limiting state probability is a
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function with two variables p and q. Since both variables are probabilities, we need to
understand the behavior of both variables along their axes. The partial derivative of π 1
(7.6) according to p-axis shows an increase with p:
1 − 𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1 1(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) − 𝑝𝑝(1)
=
=
>0
(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2
(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

(7.6)

The partial derivative of π 1 according to variable q shows the increase on the q-axis. We
need to find out which of the two variable p or q will make π 1 increase faster.

And

𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
−𝑝𝑝(−1)
𝑝𝑝
=
=
>0
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2
(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
1 − 𝑞𝑞 − 𝑝𝑝
−
=
(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

(7.7)

(7.8)

The differential of equations (7.7) and both probabilities p, q produces equation (7.8)
which shows that the variable that increase faster depend on the sign of 1 - q - p. If the
goal of the system administrator is to maximize the long-term fraction of time during
which the system is UP (in state 1), then security investments need to be made in order to
increase the variable p or q that makes 𝜋𝜋1 increase faster. Equation (7.8) shows that:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑞𝑞 < 1 − 𝑝𝑝 ⟹
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝
�
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑞𝑞 ≥ 1 − 𝑝𝑝 ⟹
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑞𝑞
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(7.9)

7.2.3

Security Functions

Let us consider that q = 0 (respectively p = 0) if no investment is made in agility
(respectively in recovery). We also consider that q < 1 (respectively p < 1) in case a huge
investment is made in agility (respectively in recovery). We consider two security
functions: the agility function and the recovery function. The agility function (respectively
recovery function) take as input the amount of dollar x invested in agility (respectively
recovery) and return as output the probability q (p respectively). We make two reasonable
assumptions: 1) every dollar spent on agility (respectively recovery) increases probability
q (respectively p) and 2) As the total amount spent on agility (respectively recovery)
increases, the marginal rate of increase in probability q (respectively p) decreases [83]
[84]. With these considerations, the probabilities q and p can be represented by: 𝑞𝑞 = 1 −

𝑒𝑒 −𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 and 𝑝𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒 −𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . The parameters α and β represent scaling factors for the
function p and q, respectively.
7.2.4

Resource Allocation Scheme and Illustration

Equation (7.9) shows that the optimum investment in agility or recovery is governed
by the relative value of q and (1 – p). Figure 7.2 shows the probability q and (1 - p) as a
function of investment. For this illustration, we have chosen β = 0.75 and three different
values for α, α = 0.5, 0.75, 1.5. the probability q is an increasing function of the
investment. The probability p also increases with the investment. However, the function
(1 - p) decreases with the investment. Each function (1 - p) crosses the function q in a
single point of coordinate (x*, q*). We can see from Figure 7.2 and Equation (7.9) that:
1) If x < x* → q < 1 - p, then all investment must be in recovery
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2) If x ≥ x* → q ≥ 1 - p, then x* must be invested in agility and the remainder of (x –
x*) invested in recovery.
For instance, with α = 0.5 and β = 0.75, the graph of the probability q and (1 - p)
intersects at x* = 1.12, which means, in a mission-critical system, if the available
investment is less than 1.12, it will be best to invest in recovery. In cases where resources
to be allocated are greater than 1.12 then the difference is to be allocated to agility. When
α = 1.5 and β = 0.75, then x* = 0.66. In fact, x* decreases with α while it increases with
β.

Probability q and (1-p) as a function of Investment
1
0.9
0.8

Probability q and 1-p

0.7
probability 1-p = exp(-0.75*x)

0.6

probability q = 1-exp(-0.75*x)
probability 1-p = exp(-0.5*x)

0.5

probability 1-p = exp(-1.5*x)
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0.2
0.1
0
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Figure 7.2: Probability q and (1-p) as a function of Investment.
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7.3

THE MDP MODEL FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Resource allocation is important in cyber security, especially when the need of SLAs

will help assist any system to remain functional in cyberspace. The previous sections did
allow us to use the security investment functions in the presence of a two-state Markov
chain to modify the values of probabilities p and q. Moreover, with a transition
probability attaches to every state transition, there is an intervention or interaction to
trigger the change of states. The system administrator main objective is to keep the
system in active state which means there is a reward when the system is up and a cost
attached due to attack when the system is down.
According to the above, we are in the presence of a two-state system. The system
changes state because of an attack perpetrated, the attack may be man-made or natural. A
critical system implemented to run with most of the agility’s component in a cyber
environment should explore the possibility of making a decision when the system in a
degraded state is given. Decision-making is only related to the system’s current state; it is
irrelevant to the previous actions and state. The MDP model can be described as follows:
7.3.1

State Space

The state space S is a finite set of states, S = {S 0 , S 1 } as in Figure 7.1. |S| denotes the
total number of states in the system.
7.3.2

Action Space

A finite and non-empty set of available actions A(S i ) ={a k } k=1,…,|A(Si)| associated to each
state s i ϵ S. Actions associated to a state either move the system to a different state or
remain on the same state (loop). For example, A 0 = {a 00 , a 01 } are the actions available in
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state S 0 ; action a 00 makes the system remains on state S 0 , and action a 01 takes the system
from state S 0 to state S 1 .
7.3.3

Transition Probability

Given the time t, an action a ϵ A(s) selected in state S can transfer the system into a new
state S’ following a transition probability P a (s, s’). The transition matrix probability is
defined as in equation (7.1).
7.3.4

Reward

Given the decision-making epoch t, the selection of an action a ϵ A(s) in state S can
generate a real-valued one-step reward function. R a (s, s’) is the immediate reward
incurred by the system as it is in state s, the action a is chosen and s’ is the next time
state.
7.3.5 Discount Factor
The discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] describes the value of the future payoff as compared to
the current payoff. Through the MDP-based approach, the main goal of a decision maker
is to find an optimal policy, π*(s). The optimal policy prescribes the best possible action
at any time t that the decision maker is in state s. The optimal policy π*(s) maximizes the

δ-discounted average reward:
∞

(1 − 𝛿𝛿) � 𝛿𝛿 𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 , 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 )
𝑡𝑡=0
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(7.10)

7.3.6

Optimal Algorithm

In this section, we introduce the optimality equations and implementation through the
value iteration method to find the solutions. The solutions of the equation correspond to
the optimal value functions, which also provide the basis for determining optimal
policies. Under the policy π, the state-value function is used to evaluate the set of
possible policies which, if executed will solve the problem presented in this chapter. The
state-value function 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋 of a state s is the expected return in reward point when starting in

s and policy π is applied. The bellman equation is:

𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋 (𝑠𝑠) = � 𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠, 𝑎𝑎) � 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 (𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠 ′ )[𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 (𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠 ′ ) + 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋 (𝑠𝑠 ′ )]
𝑎𝑎∈𝐴𝐴(𝑠𝑠)

𝑠𝑠 ′ ∈ 𝑆𝑆

(7.11)

The optimal value function is defined as follows:
𝑉𝑉 ∗ (𝑠𝑠) = max 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋 (𝑠𝑠), ∀𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆
𝜋𝜋

(7.12)

The value iteration method [31] is used to find the optimum policy. The value iteration
algorithm is presented in Table 7.2. The algorithm converges to the optimal state-value
function V*, thus, to the optimal deterministic policy. The optimal action for each state is
derived from the iteration algorithm. The transition matrix and the reward value
determine the action. The value iteration algorithm is as defined in table 7.2.

138

1.

V0(s) = 0

2.
3.
4.

For each state s
For each action a
Compute Qk(s,a) = R(s,a) + ∑j δ P(s,a)V(s’)

5.

Until ∀s, |V i+1 (s) – V i (s)| < ε

6.

Compute and store π*(s) = arg maxa Qk(s,a)

7.

Compute and store V i (s)= Q(s, π*(s))

8.

Return < π*(s), V(s) >
Table 7.2: Value Iteration Algorithm

7.4
7.4.1

SIMULATION RESULTS
Model Illustration

In real life situations, probability q derives from the amount of resource allocated in
terms of manpower and investments [76] to keep a mission-critical system in state S 1 .
The probability p is derived from the resources allocated to the system after a breach
occurred from attack to switch the system back to state S 1 . In a broad sense, if probability
p = 0, meaning there is no resource allocated for recovery in case of an attack, then the
long term confrontation between attacker and defender will end with the system in state
S 0 and no way to switch to state S 1 . With the probability p > 0, there is a recovery
module or process implemented. The proportion of resources allocated to system’s
recovery depends on how long the system will remain offline and how costly is the loss
due to the system being offline and not operational.
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The measurement parameters such as, the mean time to recovery (MTTR), the mean
time to failure (MTTF) are known for: calculating the average time that a system will
take to recover from failure (MTTR) and the MTTF is the length of time expected for the
system to remain operational before any failure occurred [67]. These metrics and more
sustain the necessity to have the correct amount of resources allocated to recovery.
An illustrative example is to assign one unit of reward per time period for any action
taken on the system, R 01 = +1; R 11 = +1; R 00 = -1; R 10 = -1. Here, reward R 01 gains one
unit which means, the system recovers from a failure attack. R 11 gains one unit for the
system to remain active after an attack was launched. R 00 costs one unit for the system to
remain off after an attempt to recover, and also it will cost one unit in R 10 for the system to
fail. Let’s consider a unit is gained when the system remains in S 1 after an attack is
perpetrated or switches from S 0 to S 1 after a recovery action. A unit is lost when an attack
succeeded or a recovery action failed. Each time a mission-critical system is down, the
next action or optimal action may be to bring the system back up in a running state in case
the costs are lower than the loss to leave the system in a degraded state. When the system
is in state S 1 , there are implemented resources to circumvent and avoid failure or switch to
state 0 or down.
7.4.2 Interpretation
This section provides a more detailed analysis of our MDP model illustration. The
MATLAB simulations are to support the analyzed techniques presented. Notice that this
work has proposed a high level MDP modeling of decision of resources allocation for a
system in cyberspace. In fact, the result of any specific experiment will depend on the
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value attributed to the eight parameters p, q, R 00 , R 01 , R 11 , R 10 , δ and ε, where ε
represents the error margin and it’s a smaller positive number.
Cost R10 When Probability p changes
-1
-1.2

Frontier of Optimal Policy with q=0.70; R01=1; R00=-1; R11=1
Frontier of Optimal Policy with q=0.85; R01=1; R00=-1; R11=1

-1.4

Reward/Cost R10

-1.6
-1.8
-2
-2.2
-2.4
-2.6
-2.8
-3
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0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5
Probability p

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Figure 7.3: Resources variation between p and R 10

The specific values we have used in MATLAB simulations are just to illustrate a few
specific scenarios. Generally, performance results will depend on the specific
implementation that will also depend on particularities of the network. We examine the
change in system reliability and effective behavior over time based on our dynamic
analysis of a two-state MDP system [85].
Figure 7.3 shows changes in reward/cost when the system switches from state S 0 to S 1
with probability p. Probability q = {0.70 for red frontier, 0.85 for blue frontier} is fixed,
the cost of having the system “ON” increases with the probability of p. We can see that
by investing in the recovery module, the probability 1-p will be lower and the system will
not remain in the fail or degraded state for too long. With the investment already made in
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agility to keep the system “ON”, loss R 10 will be reduced to a minimum. Hence, the
optimal action will be to recover the system each time it fails or switches into state S 0 .
The MTTR decreases when resources are allocated to recovery process.
The graph also reveals that, an increase of investment on agility when is already q = 0.7
does not seems efficient. Therefore, a 15% increase in investment on agility for q = 0.85
does not reduce the loss in to the system to fail.

Frontier Between Optimal Policy Actions When q Changes
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Figure 7.4: Behavior of Probabilities p and q

In case q=0.85, the optimal policy dictates for the system to be above the frontier and
have to exit state S 0 with recovery. If the intention is to lower the cost R 10 , it might be
efficient when there is a failure in state S 0 to remain off by positioning itself below the
frontier.
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Frontier for Optimal Policy Actions 00 and 01
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Figure 7.5: Frontier of Optimal Actions Between p and R 01

Figure 7.4 shows the variations between probabilities p and q when the remaining
parameters are unchanged. The frontier of the change between optimal actions 00 and 01
in state S 0 is almost at the same point p=0.5 (respectively p=0.95) and R 10 =-2
(respectively R 10 =-3) with the remaining reward/cost set at R 00 =-1, R 01 =+1, R 11 =+1.
For R 10 = -2, the red line is the frontier. Below the red line (p < 0.5), the optimum
policy is to invest in agility because of the small probability of recovery. Above the red
line, (p > 0.5), there is a big probability of recovery changing the optimum policy which
become to invest in recovery. Surprisingly, changing the probability q has little effect on
the optimum policy as demonstrated by the almost horizontal line. However, changing
R 10 has a big impact. The frontier changes from p = 0.5 to p = 0.95 when the value of
R 10 changes from -2 to -3.
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Figure 7.5 captures the frontier variations between the probability p and the reward R 01 .
Below the frontier, both the probability to recover p and the reward to recover R 01 are
low and thus the optimum policy is to invest in agility. Above the frontier, both the
probability to recover p and the reward to recover R 01 are high and thus the optimum
policy is to invest in recovery.
Figure 7.6 shows the reward R 11 and the cost R 10 of our system in state S 1 . The minimal
cost R 10 =-2.74 is obtained with probability q set to 0.9. The cost of failure R 10 is too high
below the frontier and thus the optimal policy is to invest in agility to avoid any costly
failure. Above the frontier the optimal policy is to invest in recovery. We can see that the
optimal policy is very sensitive to the variation of R 11 .
Frontier Between Optimal Policy Actions 01 and 00 at State 0
-2.7

-2.75

Reward/Cost R10

-2.8
Frontier at p=0.9; q=0.9; R00=-1; R01=+1
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1.5
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Figure 7.6: Frontier Actions Between Reward R 10 and R 11
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3.5

7.5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We investigate in this chapter, the issue of resource allocation in cybersecurity in terms
of proportion sharing between agility and recovery, while approaching it by using the
Markov decision process. First, the chapter explores the resource allocation proportion
between agility and recovery using the Markov chain and presents the findings through
limiting states probability, such that requirements from security investment should be
available for the recovery component and then agility component. Second, the chapter
extends the results from a Markov chain to a Markov decision process. The optimal
allocation solutions should consider the gains from investing in the recovery component.
The switch from a degraded state 0 to active state 1 after a period of time for any system
means that the system has a recovery model implemented. Using simulations and the
metrics MTTR and MTTF, this work also shows a repartition of resources that affects a
mission-critical system’s performance in cybersecurity.
In the future, we will consider the case of breaking down agility and recovery into
multiple states with non-symmetrical interactions between states. We will also investigate
the use of game theoretic models for resource optimization.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, we have explored the problem of incentivizing cooperation in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In a MANET as we have mentioned, there is no
infrastructure to support information exchange like dedicated routers or access points.
Rather, nodes have to play the crucial role of relays to help transfer data-packets across
the network. With this responsibility, autonomous nodes with selfish behavior may arise
to preserve nodes' energy. Cooperation among entities of such networks is important and
indispensable to keep them operational in the face of selfish behavior. Adding to the fact
that the autonomous node is also moving, the mobility of a device can deter or make it
difficult for a selfish node to participate in overall network objectives.
This chapter reflects the contributions, discusses the limitations and proposes the future
direction of our research.
8.1

DISCUSSIONS

8.1.1

Data Delivery in Mobile Environment with Incentives

We designed an incentive dynamic data delivery for a mobile environment, where mobile
a node can move randomly and still participate in data-packet forwarding. We defined the
bargaining model, which took into consideration the mobility factor and parameters like
speed, direction and available resources of a node. Based on the routing protocol for node
discovery in the mobile network, we presented the mechanism for selecting the most
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appropriate candidate as an intermediary node. Also, the splitting rule is followed by each
negotiator during the bargaining sequence. We defined the proper evaluation metrics to
evaluate the nodes participating in the overall performance of the MANET compared to
other methods. The effectiveness was presented with OMNET++ as our simulation
environment, where node mobility is captured as close as possible to reality. The
simulation results are presented.
Limitations in the design and implementation are the overhead messages and extra power
consumption for a longer bargaining time. Because of the message exchange during
negotiation and the density of the network, when two nodes are in bargaining mode, their
speed should be limited. A stopping procedure for the bargaining process has to be
implemented in order to shorten the energy depletion.
8.1.2

Arbitration in Mobile Environment to Allocate Resources

In a mobile heterogenous environment where nodes are not homogenous, we designed an
arbitration solution for heterogeneous MANETs in the presence of selfish nodes. We
integrated into our solution an incentive mechanism to stimulate and enforce nonparticipative nodes to be part of the overall network objectives. We have simulated the
arbitration solution and shown the effectiveness of applying arbitrators in a completely
mobile environment to ease and secure the data transfer. By deploying arbitrators with
better radio transmission range, number of hops are reduced, which also reduced the
amount of energy consumption for a packet to travel from source to destination. By
reducing the number of hops for a packet to travel from a source node to its destination
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node, it also increases the security of the network because we have less packets traveling
on airwaves.
So far, we have only considered selfish nodes acting alone. The detection of malicious
nodes or a coalition of malicious nodes during negotiation will improve the performance
of the arbitrators in the network. Another improvement is to relax the responsibility of the
arbitrator in detecting misbehaving nodes and have all nodes neighbors look after each
other.
8.1.3

Network Security Game: Modeling Security and Trust Relationship in MANETs

We applied the User-Defender-Attacker game theoretic model to design the interactions
between users, defenders, and attackers of the system in cyberspace. We formulated the
characteristics of each interactive entity, including selfishness and non-cooperativeness.
We also evaluated the level of security of the network and the trustworthiness of the
network against attacks. The equilibrium strategies of the three-player game are derived.
The simulation results are presented.
Users trust in terms of loss when the attacker breaches the system and compromises
users’ private data. The exact quantification of the user’s loss has not been analyzed. For
example, when a provider system is breached because of less investment in security and
the users are informed through mass media, the trust between the provider and the users
should be reevaluated and the provider penalized.
8.2

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The first part of this research mainly involves enforcing and stimulating cooperation to
forward packets in a completely mobile environment. Regardless of the above-mentioned
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improvements, there are other potential directions to enhance the current work, and
develop a more comprehensive security and cooperation in MANETs using the game
theory frameworks. A comprehensive model for an autonomous network can then be
developed. Clearly, cross layer optimization techniques will improve the security and the
cooperation using the framework of the game

8.2.1

Stochastic Pricing and Resource Allocation Games

The dynamic programming techniques used in Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the problem
for a single decision maker acting in a mobile environment. In the asymmetric bargaining
model introduced in Chapter 4, players’ bargaining powers depend on their bids, which
can be determined using the admission price for an optimal pricing policy or an auction.
Like the authors in resource allocation [25], we have assumed that network users do not
anticipate their effect on the resource allocated. However, when the users recognize that
they are not merely accepting the offers, the problem becomes a game in which the
setting of willingness-to-pay, demand and bids becomes strategic for the network users.
Users make self-serving decisions and economists are well aware that these selfish
behaviors can lead to inefficiency. Johari et al. [7] showed that the price of anarchy in
networks with elastic supply amounts to up to 25% in efficiency loss. The measurement
is obtained by computing the ratio of the NE utility function to the socially optimal utility
function and showing that it is ¾ at worst [7]. Stochastic games are natural extensions of
Markov decision processes to include multiple decision makers.
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There are some similarities between the node degree of distribution on the real and
simulated MANET, while links are much more unstable and asymmetric in real life than
in a simulated MANETs environment. To alleviate this discrepancy, the link status can be
modeled in a MANET using a state Markov chain model. However, the lack of available
data generated from real MANET experiments could not statistically confirm these
claims. Moreover, with some analytical works, we think that this future work can produce
promising models to better simulate link status in MANETs.

8.2.2

Non-cooperative Implementation of the Cooperative Bargaining Solutions in Self-

organizing and Self-healing Networks
In Chapter 4, we have derived a class of bargaining solutions using the bargaining
concepts from cooperative game theory. The payoffs, indicated by the amount of
resources allocated to the players, are sustained by a binding agreement guaranteed by
each node in the network and the arbitrator. However, the enforcement of such payoffs
falls outside of the domain of cooperative game theory. In MANETs, the decisionmaking process has to be decentralized, as in a non-cooperative game. A MANET is a
collection of nodes that forms a network without fixed-infrastructure. As opposed to
networks which use routers to support network functions, such as packet routing and
forwarding, these functions are provided by the nodes (or hosts) themselves. Such a
network can operate in a standalone fashion or may be connected to the Internet. The
interconnections among nodes often change continually and arbitrarily. These networks
were initially designed for military operations and play an increasingly important role in
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many environments, such as ad hoc networking for collaborative and distributed disaster
recovery, search-and-rescue and crowd control. More recently, they have been envisaged
as able to provide Internet connectivity for nodes that are not in transmission range of a
wireless access point. The IEEE 802.11 wireless protocol incorporates an ad hoc
networking system when no access points are present.
In wireless mobile networks (WMNs), all routers are capable of organizing and autoreconfiguring themselves wirelessly, which means that no cabling is needed to connect
them. These nodes form a rich radio mesh connectivity among themselves that is difficult
to provide in wired networks. The principle is similar to the wired Internet; data will hop
from one node to another until it reaches its given destination. While wireless node
connectivity significantly reduces the upfront deployment and subsequent maintenance
costs, the rich mesh connectivity helps to deliver high levels of reliability and robustness.
Mesh networks are self-healing and extremely reliable because each node is connected to
several others and if one drops out, due to hardware failure or man-made attacks, its
neighbors simply find another route. Because of these attractive features, WMN is being
considered for a wide variety of applications, such as backhaul connectivity for cellular
radio access networks, combat systems and citywide surveillance systems. It can
effectively extend a network by sharing access to a higher cost network infrastructure.
Due to the complexity of the mobility and traffic models as well as the infrastructureless,
dynamic topology of these networks, non-cooperative game theory is the primary tool for
studying players, which are independent decision makers whose actions potentially result
in efficiency loss. A vast number of works on the application of non-cooperative game
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theory in MANETs are surveyed in [42]. Another approach is to study the
implementation of the Pareto-optimal bargaining solutions in a non-cooperative manner.
8.2.3

Route Calculation Based on Routing protocol and Coalition Information

The way the non-cooperation model is currently integrated with the routing protocol
(AODV) in chapter 3 helps fight selfish behavior through the bargaining agreement: Do
not drop packets sent from or destined to members after agreement. However, this can be
more effective if AODV proactively uses the nodes that are inclined to accept offers
available to build its routing table. For example, AODV could be modified to give
priority in choosing multi point relays (MPRs) to alliance companions such that resulting
routes involve more nodes with less bargaining power, hence achieving more reliable
routes. This could greatly enhance the packet delivery ratio of the network under the
integrated system. We highly believe that this could be a promising future of the current
work.
8.3

SUMMARY

In this dissertation, we have explored the problem of stimulating cooperation in mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs) by investigating nodes cooperation in improving the
network throughput using the bargaining game theoretic model. We investigated the data
forwarding task between nodes in a highly dynamic network using an arbitrator for
resource allocation. Also, the investigation led us to consider the possibility of having
colluded nodes in our mobile ad-hoc network interfering with the arbitrator negotiation
process. In order to prevent complacent offers to players, the arbitrator uses a random
generator to assign offer without memory of previous offers. Finally, we investigated the
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interactions between users, providers and attackers in cyberspace using a three-player
game theoretic approach to strengthen the security by providing to decision-makers the
optimized investment in defending users’ privacy and private data against security
breaches.
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